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ABSTRACT
Members of Congress largely acquiesce to judicial supremacy both
on constitutional and statutory interpretation questions. Lawmakers,
however, do not formally embrace judicial supremacy; they rarely
think about the courts when enacting legislation. This Article ex-
plains why this is so, focusing on why lawmakers have both strong
incentive to acquiesce to judicial power and little incentive to
advance a coherent view of congressional power. In particular,
lawmakers are interested in advancing favored policies, winning
reelection, and gaining personal power within Congress. Abstract
questions of institutional power do not interest lawmakers and
judicial defeats are seen as opportunities to find some other way to
advance the same policy priorities. Relatedly, party polarization cuts
against bipartisan embraces of pro-Congress views of the law and
cuts in favor of Democrats and Republicans advancing competing
views of congressional authority. Finally, Congress makes use of in-
stitutional structures that accentuate lawmaker disinterest in legal
questions and treat the courts as the last word in legal disputes. The
committee system, the Offices of Legislative Counsel, the Congressio-
nal Research Service, and the offices of House and Senate counsel all
contribute to Congress’s acceptance of judicial supremacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Let me start with a confession: I set out to write an article on why
Congress affirmatively backs judicial supremacy. After all, there are
numerous examples of Congress seeking political cover by explicitly
punting issues to the Supreme Court.1 At the same time, these ex-
amples are unrepresentative of the larger whole. They suggest that
Congress is actually thinking about the judicial role and the
political advantages of a judicial supremacy regime.2 The truth,
however, is that Congress rarely thinks about the courts when en-
acting legislation.3 Correspondingly, lawmakers never think about
articulating a distinctive pro-Congress view of either Congress’s
constitutional authority or theories of statutory interpretation.4 On
those rare occasions when Congress contemplates judicial review of
its handiwork, the sole focus of lawmakers and staff is on what the
courts will do—not what the courts should do.5 For example, when
responding to Supreme Court rulings, lawmakers hardly ever
criticize the Court or push the Court to consider a new theory of
constitutional or statutory interpretation; instead, lawmakers oper-
ate within the boundaries set by the Court.6
1. For a specific example, Senator Arlen Specter voted in support of legislation denying
federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving military
commissions; Specter thought the provision unconstitutional and, in explaining his vote,
remarked that he was sure the courts would “clean it up.” See Paul A. Diller, When Congress
Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU
L. REV. 281, 283 (2008) (quoting Daniel Michael, The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 44
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 473, 479 (2007)); see also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS 57-58 (1999) (arguing that the knowledge that the courts will police con-
stitutional issues deters lawmakers from taking account of constitutional issues); Neal
Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court’s Anti-Congress Crusade,
51 DUKE L.J. 435, 442-44 (2001) (discussing Congress’s use of expedited Supreme Court re-
view provisions to punt contentious constitutional questions to the Court); Mark A. Graber,
The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV.
35, 37-38 (1993) (arguing that prominent elected officials look for courts to resolve constitu-
tional controversies that they cannot resolve or would prefer not to resolve).
2. For an excellent treatment of the political advantages of a judicial supremacy regime,
see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 8-18, 22-27
(2007).
3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT
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My Article will explain why this is so, focusing on why lawmakers
have both strong incentive to acquiesce to judicial power and little
incentive to advance a coherent view of congressional power. In
part, lawmakers are uninterested in abstract questions of institu-
tional power; instead, lawmakers are interested in advancing their
vision of good public policy, winning reelection, and gaining person-
al power within Congress.7 Relatedly, lawmakers hardly ever have
incentive to speak with a unitary voice.8 Lawmakers who oppose a
measure will embrace a narrow view of congressional power; law-
makers who support the measure will back a broad view.9 Further
reflecting Congress’s focus on policy goals and not judicial theories,
lawmakers and their staff—when drafting legislation—largely del-
egate legal questions to two court-centric offices within Congress:
the Offices of Legislative Counsel and the Congressional Research
Service’s American Law Division.10 These offices have no interest in
advancing a broad or coherent view of congressional power; instead,
they assume that courts speak the last word on legal questions and
that precedent is to be adhered to, not challenged.11 More telling,
lawmakers essentially give the Department of Justice (DOJ) a free
hand to craft legal arguments in court.12 The House or Senate is
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 23-30, 147-53 (2004).
7. See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1-14 (1973); DAVID R.
MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13-19 (1974); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian
Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1286-90 (2001);
John W. Kingdon, Models of Legislative Voting, 39 J. POLITICS 563, 569-70 (1977).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part I.C.
10. See infra Part II (discussing court-centric norms in these offices). For general discus-
sion of the structure and norms of these offices, see Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 739-44 (2014); Louis Fisher, Consti-
tutional Analysis by Congressional Staff Agencies, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 64,
68-73, 75-81 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005); Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal
Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807,
818-43 (2014).
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B.
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hardly ever a party to a legal dispute;13 Congress has also left it to
the court-centric Judiciary Committees to oversee the DOJ.14
In short, the individual incentives of lawmakers and the corre-
sponding institutional structures that Congress makes use of both
cut against lawmaker interest and involvement in legal questions.
Making matters worse, party polarization exacerbates lawmaker
tendencies to trade off institutional prerogatives for policy goals.15
With Democrats and Republicans increasingly pursuing conflicting
agendas and with power increasingly centralized in House and Sen-
ate leadership, party polarization cuts against lawmakers thinking
concretely about legal issues, let alone asserting a pro-Congress
view of the law.16 Correspondingly, Congress exercises power
through bicameral legislation and cannot resist the courts or the
executive without strong majorities in both houses.17 Indeed, as
compared to its powers over the executive (some of which do not
require bicameral action, for example, the powers to confirm and
13. The House or Senate, but not Congress, can participate as a party in litigation with
respect to enforcement of internal rules, including committee-issued subpoenas. See Tara
Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 571, 628-30 (2014). It is unclear if the House or Senate may participate in
other contexts, most notably, the defense of federal statutes. See id. at 622-28 (noting that the
Supreme Court has yet to definitively settle this question and suggesting that Congress can-
not defend federal statutes). For a competing perspective, see Jack M. Beermann, Congress’s
(Less) Limited Power to Represent Itself in Court: A Comment on Grove and Devins, 99 COR-
NELL L. REV. ONLINE 166, 167-68, 180-81 (2014); see also Amanda Frost, Congress in Court,
59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 948-51, 953-56 (2012) (arguing that Congress must play a more
substantial role in litigation in order to defend its institutional priorities).
14. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle that Never Was: Congress, the White
House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 205,
214-15, 221.
15. I have made this point before. See Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional
Committee Consideration of Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 759-62 (2011)
[hereinafter Devins, Party Polarization]; Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political
Polarization: Why Today’s Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initia-
tives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395, 408-13 (2009) [hereinafter Devins, Presidential Unilater-
alism].
16. See Devins, Party Polarization, supra note 15, at 756-59.
17. See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,
15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 143-48 (1999) (explaining structural and political impediments to
Congress’s resisting executive branch initiatives); Keith E. Whittington, Commentary, Taking
What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 509 &
n.154 (2001) (arguing that Congress will only challenge judicial decisions in rare cases in
which the Court undermines the ability to pursue first-order policy preferences).
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investigate), Congress has few levers of power to influence the judic-
iary.18
In making these points, this Article extends existing scholarship
on Congress’s interest in legal questions. Several scholars, myself
included, have examined why it is that Congress is interested in
issues of policy and power, not abstract issues involving the scope
of Congress’s power to advance a pro-Congress view of constitution-
al or statutory interpretation.19 Scholars, too, have examined the
issue of Congress-federal court dialogue through examinations of
the Offices of Legislative Counsel and the ability of today’s polarized
Congress to override disfavored statutory interpretation cases.20
This Article seeks to connect the dots of existing scholarship and
advance a more nuanced explanation for why Congress acquiesces
to judicial interpretations of the Constitution and federal statutes.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I contrasts the
institutional incentives of Congress and the executive and, in so
doing, explains why lawmakers are generally uninterested in legal
questions and, relatedly, why Congress lacks the institutional will
to advance a coherent pro-Congress view of legal issues. Part I also
explains how party polarization exacerbates Congress’s tendencies
to discount legal questions. Part II considers institutional structures
in Congress and how those structures both accentuate lawmakers’
disinterest in legal questions and treat the courts as the last word
18. For a discussion of Congress-executive negotiations, see Neal Devins, Congressional-
Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV.
109, 120-22 (1996) [hereinafter Devins, A Modest Proposal]. For discussions of Congress’s un-
willingness to use its exceptions power to limit Court authority and how it is that court-strip-
ping proposals are not likely to be acted on by a polarized Congress, see Neal Devins, Essay,
Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1358-62 (2006) [hereinafter
Devins, Fear Congress?]; Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 931-32, 982-84 (2013).
19. See PICKERILL, supra note 6, at 23-30, 147-48, 151-53; Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does
Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 609-10 (1983); Keith E.
Whittington, James Madison Has Left the Building, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1146-48 (2005)
(reviewing PICKERILL, supra note 6).
20. For discussions of congressional offices, see sources supra note 10. For discussions of
congressional polarization and its impact on statutory overrides, compare Richard L. Hasen,
End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L.
REV. 205, 233-42 (2013) (arguing polarization limits overrides), with Matthew R. Christiansen
& William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpre-
tation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319-20 (2014) (contrasting high publicity
overrides when polarization is relevant to routine policy-updating overrides).
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in legal disputes. Part II will focus on the committee system, the
ascendency of the court-centric Judiciary Committee to oversee legal
questions and the DOJ, and the role of the nonpartisan, court-
centric Offices of Legislative Counsel and Congressional Research
Service. Part II will also contrast the executive to Congress, noting
how the institutional structures of the executive branch facilitate
pro-executive understandings of the law.21 Part III is a summary
and extension of the first two Parts. Specifically, Part III considers
how Senate judicial confirmation fights and Congress’s refusal to
limit federal court jurisdiction support my conclusions about Con-
gress’s acceptance of judicial supremacy. 
I. INSTITUTIONAL INCENTIVES
The Constitution does not detail the actual powers of the three
branches; instead, the “ongoing practice of politics” defines the prac-
tical rights of each branch to exercise power both “in an absolute
sense and relative to one another.”22 The early Congresses were
vigorous defenders of legislative prerogatives. On war powers, Con-
gress routinely asserted its prerogative to declare war, and Presi-
dents and the Supreme Court alike saw Congress as empowered to
“declare a general war or ... a limited war.”23 On issues implicating
judicial power, Congress expressed its disapproval of the Marbury
v. Madison litigation both by canceling the Supreme Court’s 1802
term and by refusing to honor a Court order to turn over documents
concerning the Marbury appointment.24 The Jeffersonian Congress,
too, threatened to use its impeachment power to clear the bench of
disliked Federalist judges.25 The Supreme Court did not fight back.
21. On the other hand, the very offices that make pro-executive legal arguments also have
incentives to embrace a court-centered view of the law so that the executive rarely challenges
judicial supremacy while advocating pro-executive understandings of the law. See Neal Devins
& Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507, 537-59
(2012).
22. Moe & Howell, supra note 17, at 135.
23. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800) (opinion of Chase, J.). For additional discus-
sion, see NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 137-42 (2d ed. 2015). 
24. See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25-
28 (5th ed. 2011).
25. See id. at 26-27.
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Court decisions tracked legislative debates.26 Perhaps more telling,
Marbury was the only case to invalidate an act of Congress before
1857; the Court and Chief Justice John Marshall argued that Con-
gress should not impeach judges but, instead, should recognize the
“mildness” of the judicial character by statutorily reversing “legal
opinions deemed unsound.”27
Today’s Congress, however, lacks both the will and the way to
assert a strong view of congressional power to either the courts or
executive.28 Lawmaker motivations cut against both broad asser-
tions of institutional prerogatives and efforts to coordinate with
other lawmakers to advance a pro-Congress agenda. Party polariza-
tion exacerbates these inclinations. By way of contrast, the unitary
structure of the executive incentivizes the President to embrace
departmentalism and advance a consistent pro-executive vision of
executive power. This Part will initially contrast the incentives of
the modern-day executive and Congress; it will then consider more
concretely why today’s lawmakers have little reason both to think
about congressional power and to work together to advance a pro-
Congress view of the law.
A. The Competing Incentives of Congress and the Executive
The individual and institutional interests of the President are
one and the same. Thanks both to the singularity of the office and
the power to execute, Presidents have both the tools and incentives
to advance their agenda and the scope of presidential power.
26. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-
1801, at 78-80 (1997) (discussing how the Supreme Court decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), tracked legislative debates about Congress’s ability to act with-
out an explicit constitutional grant and create a national bank).
27. ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, 3 THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 177 (1919) (quoting letter from
Marshall to Justice Samuel Chase).
28. The focus of this Article is the modern Congress. In an earlier piece, I detailed several
sources that explain differences between the incentives of today’s lawmakers and those of
lawmakers in earlier Congresses, including the rise of the administrative state, the related
expansion of Supreme Court review of governmental action, and changes in how lawmakers
pursue all facets of their job (time spent in their districts and states associated with
campaigning, fundraising, and constituent services; the growth of government and related
need to delegate to staff; and the polarization and increasing importance of party politics).
See Neal Devins, The Constitutional Politics of Congress, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 155, 170-75 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2015).
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Professors Terry Moe and William Howell put it this way: “[W]hen
presidents feel it is in their political interests, they can put what-
ever decisions they like to strategic use, both in gaining policy
advantage and in pushing out the boundaries of their power.”29 Most
notably, by acting unilaterally and end-running Congress, Presi-
dents routinely expand the boundaries of both their inherent
constitutional authority and statutory grants of authority. For
example, Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack
Obama all pursued signature initiatives unilaterally after Congress
refused to enact legislation supporting presidential priorities.
Clinton pursued health-care reform, Bush pursued faith-based
initiatives, and Obama pursued immigration reform.30
The power to execute also expands presidential authority vis-à-
vis the judiciary. Presidents control legal arguments that the federal
government makes in court and routinely advocate for broad views
of presidential power, including limits on the jurisdiction of federal
courts to review presidential initiatives.31 Presidents can also keep
an issue from the courts and, in so doing, effectively nullify a law or
regulation. In particular, by refusing to enforce or defend that which
the DOJ thinks is unconstitutional, there may be no one with
standing to challenge a presidential interpretation.32 Finally, pres-
idential interpretations of court rulings can either limit or expand
the reach of court decisions. Abraham Lincoln claimed Dred Scott v.
29. Moe & Howell, supra note 17, at 138; see also Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, Uni-
lateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 850, 865 (1999)
(explaining why Presidents are “well positioned to put their powers of unilateral action to use,
as well as to expand the bounds of these powers over time”).
30. For discussions of Clinton and Bush initiatives, see William G. Howell, Introduction,
Unilateral Powers: A Brief Overview, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 417, 418, 434-36 (2005). For
a highly critical assessment of Obama-era unilateralism, see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS:
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S UNPRECEDENTED ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
RULE OF LAW 139-43 (2015). For a speculative assessment of President Donald Trump, see
Eric Posner, And If Elected: What President Trump Could or Couldn’t Do, N.Y. TIMES (June
3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/opinion/campaign-stops/and-if-elected-what-
president-trump-could-or-couldnt-do.html [https://perma.cc/8NTD-UPH2].
31. For a general treatment of the DOJ’s embrace of pro-executive arguments, see Curtis
A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Essay, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal
Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1105-07 (2013). For examples of DOJ efforts to invoke
jurisdictional limits to legal challenges to presidential initiatives, see Tara Leigh Grove, When
Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 874-76 (2016).
32. Cf. Devins & Prakash, supra note 21, at 510-11 (arguing that the DOJ has a “near-
monopoly” on government litigation).
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Sandford was binding only on the parties and pursued policies at
odds with the decision; Bill Clinton concluded that the 1995
Supreme Court ruling that made it tougher to justify federal race
preferences, in fact, reaffirmed the necessity of affirmative action.33
Compare this to Congress.34 Unlike the unitary executive, the
individual and institutional interests of members of Congress are
often in conflict with each other.35 By focusing on first-order policy
concerns, abstract questions of institutional authority receive scant
attention.36 Lawmakers routinely take competing positions on Con-
gress’s power to advance its legislative agenda and to oversee the
executive.37 This Part will show that lawmakers rarely have incen-
tive to think about judicial review of their handiwork and even less
incentive to think about advancing a coherent pro-Congress theory
of legislative power. Consequently, while each of Congress’s 535
members has some stake in Congress as an institution, policy goals
(and related goals of reelection and power) overwhelm this collective
good.38 In describing this collective action problem, Professors Moe
and Howell note that lawmakers are “trapped in a prisoners’
dilemma: all might benefit if they could cooperate in defending or
advancing Congress’s power, but each has a strong incentive to free
ride in favor of the local constituency.”39
For this reason, lawmakers have no incentive to stop presidential
unilateralism simply because the President is expanding his or her
powers vis-à-vis Congress. This collective action problem also un-
dermines Congress’s ability to advance its agenda before the courts.
In part, lawmakers are principally interested in advancing favored
policies and generally uninterested in articulating a clear agenda
about congressional power.40 On those infrequent occasions when
lawmakers debate the boundaries of congressional power, bill
opponents embrace a narrow view of congressional authority.41
33. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 23, at 20, 224-26.
34. This paragraph is drawn from Devins, Presidential Unilateralism, supra note 15, at
400. 
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 1286-90.
39. Moe & Howell, supra note 17, at 144.
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 20, at 206 (describing Republican attempts to have
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Correspondingly, policy disagreements among lawmakers limit
Congress’s power to countermand judicial rulings.42 Perhaps more
important, Congress rarely represents itself in court. The executive
speaks the government’s voice, and lawmaker participation is often
limited to competing sets of amicus briefs.43 Indeed, outside of
House or Senate efforts to enforce subpoenas through institutional
counsel, it is unclear whether individual members or institutional
counsel have standing to defend congressional prerogatives.44 And
even when institutional counsel participates in litigation, competing
amicus briefs are often filed by members of the minority party.45 For
the balance of this Part, I will provide a fuller accounting of law-
maker motivations. In Part II, I will look at congressional organi-
zation, explaining how lawmaker motivations are reflected in the
institutional design of Congress—demonstrating that most members
steer clear of legal questions and that legal policy making is almost
exclusively delegated to court-centric offices and committees.
B. Lawmaker Motivations
Why is it that lawmakers lack motivation to work in concert to
overcome the collective action problem? More specifically, why do
lawmakers not care about preserving Congress’s institutional
authority, including a shared embrace of broad legislative and
investigatory powers? The simple answer is that the benefits of
collective action are often outweighed by the costs of pursuing
disfavored policies, of hurting reelection chances, and of limiting
opportunities for advancement within the party, including the
related benefits of serving on desirable committees.46 To start, leg-
Obamacare struck down on constitutional grounds).
42. See id. at 233-34, 237-42; Victoria F. Nourse, Response, Overrides: The Super-Study,
92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 205, 210-13 (2014).
43. For a general treatment of congressional amicus briefs, see Neal Devins, Measuring
Party Polarization in Congress: Lessons from Congressional Participation as Amicus Curiae,
65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 933, 939-41 (2015).
44. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2712-14 (2013) (discussing but not
resolving standing of the House to defend federal statutes); Grove & Devins, supra note 13,
at 622-30 (arguing that the House or Senate can seek judicial enforcement of subpoenas but
cannot defend federal statutes).
45. See infra notes 141, 273 and accompanying text.
46. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 1286-90; Kingdon, supra note 7, at 569-70,
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islators pursue a complex set of goals—some personal (designed to
maximize reelection and status or power) and some designed to
advance the public interest (the legislator’s conception of good public
policy as well as beliefs about justice and morals).47 Goals are traded
off against each other but reelection is seen as “a necessary means
to their preferred goals of influencing public policy for the better and
accumulating prestige with colleagues.”48 The “‘electoral connection’
explains most congressional behavior, ... [including] congressional
leadership, party positions, committee structures, [and] institu-
tional procedures.”49
Today, reelection means that a lawmaker must prevail in in-
creasingly polarized party primaries.50 Reelection also means that
lawmakers must increasingly focus their energies on fundraising
and constituent services.51 Today’s lawmakers strengthen their
position with their constituents by “visit[ing] their districts and
states extremely frequently (often three or four times a month).
They and their staffs devote much of their time to constituency
casework (with roughly one-third of members’ staffs based in their
home district or state).”52 Fundraising is also increasingly im-
portant; lawmakers feel pressure to raise money for their own
reelection campaigns and for their parties.53 Like constituent
services, fundraising pulls lawmakers away from “discussing the
issues ... forging legislation and monitoring federal bureaucrats”
with colleagues.54 For example, as Professors Elizabeth Garrett
and Adrian Vermeule observed, a lawmaker who invests in con-
stitutional interpretation “loses time for fundraising, casework,
575.
47. See FENNO, supra note 7, at 1; PICKERILL, supra note 6, at 21; Kingdon, supra note 7,
at 569-70, 575.
48. Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 1288.
49. PICKERILL, supra note 6, at 21.
50. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
51. See Devins, Party Polarization, supra note 15, at 763.
52. ANTHONY KING, RUNNING SCARED: WHY AMERICA’S POLITICIANS CAMPAIGN TOO
MUCH AND GOVERN TOO LITTLE 49 (1997). In the twenty years since publication of King’s
study, all available evidence suggests that members focus more on constituents today than
before. See Devins, Party Polarization, supra note 15, at 763.
53. Lawmakers advance their status in the party system, including desirable committee
assignments, by making financial contributions to the party. See Eric S. Heberlig, Congres-
sional Parties, Fundraising, and Committee Ambition, 56 POL. RES. Q. 151, 154-55 (2003).
54. 144 CONG. REC. 19,814 (1998) (remarks of Rep. Hamilton).
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media appearances, and obtaining particularized spending projects
in her district; she will thus be at a disadvantage” when seeking re-
election.55
It therefore comes as no surprise that lawmakers have little
interest in abstract discussions of legislative power. Policy making
is what matters, especially the policy priorities of the lawmaker’s
party. The combined effect of party polarization, constituency ser-
vice, and fundraising is that today’s lawmakers increasingly look to
parties and other constituents when assessing policy-making
priorities.56 There clearly is no appetite for pursuing institutional
goals such as enhancing pro-Congress interpretations of the Con-
stitution or federal statutes. Indeed, lawmaker incentives cut
against any kind of engagement with federal court decision-
making.57 Courts are largely ignored when legislation is enacted,
and court decisions limiting congressional prerogatives often go
unnoticed.58 As Chief Judge Robert Katzmann put it, “Congress is
largely oblivious of the well-being of the judiciary as an
institution.”59 And for those occasional exceptions when Congress
does take note, court decisions are “credit claiming” opportunities
for lawmakers to be on the right side of salient issues by reasserting
their policy preferences through new legislation.60
All of the above loops back to the above-identified collective action
problem; Congress might gain as an institution if courts embraced
pro-Congress views of constitutional and statutory interpretation,
but individual lawmakers will trade off that collective goal to pursue
their individual interests. For the balance of this Part, I will elab-
orate on this unsurprising claim.
55. Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 1301.
56. See Devins, Party Polarization, supra note 15, at 763.
57. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 1286-90; Kingdon, supra note 7, at 569-70,
575.
58. See Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 7 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988).
59. Id.
60. See MAYHEW, supra note 7, at 52-53.
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C. Disunitariness = Disinterest & Disarray
The executive is singularly unitary on issues of legal interpreta-
tion. Through the DOJ and the Office of Management and Budget,
the executive can coordinate issues of legal policy making governing
the promulgation of regulations and judicial challenges to executive
action.61 In court, for example, the DOJ takes great pride in ad-
vancing consistent legal arguments governing canons of statutory
interpretation and jurisdictional questions regarding challenges to
governmental conduct.62 Also, when advancing the President’s pol-
icy preferences, DOJ lawyers routinely embrace broad views of
presidential power—and never argue that the President’s action is
ultra vires and that presidential power should be constrained.63
With its 535 members, Congress is just the opposite.64 Congress is
beset by a collective action problem (the trading off of institutional
power in order to advance the priorities of a lawmaker and her
constituents),65 a related salience problem (lawmakers pursue high
salience issues that matter to their constituents),66 and a disunitar-
iness problem (lawmakers have competing policy preferences, espe-
cially in today’s polarized Congress).67 Part II will examine why
Congress is hardly ever a party in judicial or agency proceedings; it
is therefore under no obligation to advance a theory of statutory or
constitutional interpretation before a court.68
Consider, for example, two matters that cut to the core of leg-
islative power—Congress’s power to declare war and Congress’s
power to define the meaning of the statutes it enacts. In the ab-
stract, lawmakers should be interested in defending Congress’s turf
in both arenas; in practice, however, Congress seems willing to cede
61. See Devins & Herz, supra note 14, at 212-13.
62. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control
of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 571-78 (2003).
63. See Devins & Herz, supra note 14, at 219-20.
64. See id. at 220-21.
65. See Moe & Howell, supra note 17, at 144.
66. See id.
67. See Devins, Party Polarization, supra note 15, at 763-64.
68. Likewise, Congress is not obligated to have a theory of jurisdiction—including the
jurisdiction of courts to resolve legal challenges involving lawmakers, committees, or in-
stitutional counsel for the House and Senate. See infra Part II.
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its war powers to the executive69 and its power to define statutory
meaning to the courts.70 On war powers, lawmakers have very little
incentive to embrace and act on a robust view of legislative power.71
In particular, “one byproduct of an all-volunteer army is that law-
makers feel little constituent or public pressure to reign in presi-
dential warmaking.”72 Consequently, “[r]ather than oppos[ing] the
President on a potential military action, most members of Congress
find it more convenient to acquiesce and avoid criticism that they
obstructed a necessary military operation.”73 For their part, courts
do not fill the void left by Congress. As then-judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg put it, “If the Congress chooses not to confront the
President, it is not our task to do so.”74
Theories of statutory interpretation go unnoticed for another
reason. Unlike war powers, in which lawmakers duck a high visi-
bility issue that has no constituency payoff, “[m]ethods of statutory
interpretation are the arcana of a lawyerly elite” and lack sufficient
salience to hurdle the agenda bar.75 “No one ever lost an election by
saying ‘I’m for purposivism.’”76 Indeed, even though the Supreme
Court’s turn towards textualism has limited congressional control
of legislative meaning, lawmakers have not resisted the Court at
all.77 Congress has never issued a general directive on statutory
interpretation and has never mandated that legislative history be
used.78 Indeed, even though courts eschew legislative history when
interpreting statutes, lawmakers and their staffs continue to make
69. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER, at xi (1995).
70. See Nourse, supra note 42, at 214.
71. See Devins, Presidential Unilateralism, supra note 15, at 400.
72. Neal Devins, Bring Back the Draft?, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2003).
73. Devins, Presidential Unilateralism, supra note 15, at 400.
74. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979)).
75. Nourse, supra note 42, at 214.
76. Id.
77. See Frost, supra note 13, at 923-26. In 2016, House Democrats and Republicans di-
vided on proposed legislation that would eviscerate judicial deference to agency interpre-
tations in favor of judicial authority to interpret statutes de novo. See infra note 128. This bill,
which was never considered by the Senate, did not seek to shift power to Congress; the
concern of House Republicans was to limit the authority of the “lawless” Obama executive
branch. See infra note 128.
78. See Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When
Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 848-52 (2009).
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extensive use of legislative history when enacting statutes.79 The
reason: legislative history is principally a vehicle by which lawmak-
ers make “pleasing” statements to their constituencies.80 It matters
little to lawmakers whether courts find those statements persua-
sive. For similar reasons, occasional efforts to override individual
Court decisions through the enactment of another statute do not
formally challenge judicial interpretations; Congress acquiesces to
the interpretation and reaffirms its policy priorities through the
enactment of the corrective statute.81
War powers and statutory interpretation issues exemplify the
above-noted collective action and salience problems that make it
hard for Congress to find ways to articulate pro-Congress views of
the law and, relatedly, speak to the reality that Congress often has
little incentive to monitor judicial developments or participate in
judicial proceedings. Correspondingly, lawmakers are happy to ac-
quiesce to judicial or even executive supremacy rather than take the
heat for articulating pro-Congress views of the law. Lawmakers do
not think about their responsibilities to interpret the Constitution
or defend institutional prerogatives; these collective goods are
routinely traded off to pursue favored policy or otherwise advance
the personal agenda of lawmakers.
Separate from these impediments, Congress is divided in ways
that cut against its making consistent, coherent pro-Congress ar-
guments. First, lawmakers frequently divide on what policies should
be pursued and how they should be pursued.82 Correspondingly,
lawmakers who back legislation embrace a pro-Congress view of
legislative power; bill opponents back judicial limits on Congress.83
And since Congress does not participate as a party defending pro-
Congress views of the law,84 intramural squabbles spill over into leg-
islative debates and amicus filings.85 Second, and equally telling,
79. See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 10, at 739-43. 
80. See Devins, supra note 1, at 461-62. 
81. See infra Part I.D.
82. See Hasen, supra note 20, at 237-38, 241-42.
83. See infra Part I.D.
84. This, of course, distinguishes the executive from Congress and helps propel the ex-
ecutive to advance pro-executive understandings of the law in DOJ court arguments and
Office of Legal Counsel opinions. See Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 622-30; infra Part
II.B.
85. See infra Part I.D.
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lawmakers flip flop their positions on legislative power to suit their
policy preferences—sometimes espousing and other times eschewing
a broad view of legislative power.86
Federalism cases provide a good illustration of both phenomena.
Consider two statutes—one that Republicans supported and Demo-
crats opposed (the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act) and one that
divided Congress in exactly the opposite way (the Affordable Care
Act).87 Both statutes raised substantial constitutional questions,
including questions about Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause.88 When the statutes were challenged in court, Democrats
lined up in favor of congressional power in the Affordable Care Act
case and against Congress in the partial birth case.89 Republicans
took precisely the opposite position.90 In the partial birth case, 52 of
54 Democrats who signed briefs argued the statute was unconstitu-
tional; all 152 Republicans who signed briefs backed congressional
power.91 In the Affordable Care Act case, 12 briefs were submitted
by congressional amici.92 All were strictly party line; Republican
86. See infra Part I.D.
87. Republicans and Democrats largely divided along party lines when voting for the
statutes. Few Democrats voted for the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, and few Republicans
opposed it. See Office of the Clerk, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 242, U.S. HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2003/roll242.xml [https://perma.cc/W6CZ-ZGAQ];
Office of the Clerk, Senate Roll Call Vote Results for S. 3, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=108&session=1&vote=00051
[https://perma.cc/E5AT-4YC9]. No Republican in either the House or Senate voted for the
Affordable Care Act. See Office of the Clerk, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 165, U.S. HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll165.xml [https://perma.cc/S2PJ-FCJL];
Office of the Clerk, Senate Roll Call Vote Results for H.R. 3590 as Amended, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&
session=1&vote=00396 [https://perma.cc/9QKE-PLLP].
88. For the partial birth bill, see David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism
Seriously: Lopez and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REV. 59, 60-61 (1997);
Simon Lazarus, Next on Abortion: Supreme Collision, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2003), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2003/11/23/next-on-abortion-supreme-collision/
8f98085d-b7f0-4bed-946d-2471b974607e/ [https://perma.cc/6C84-BKRT]. For the Affordable
Care Act, see RANDY E. BARNETT ET AL., A CONSPIRACY AGAINST OBAMACARE: THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY AND THE HEALTH CARE CASE 2-3 (Trevor Burrus ed., 2013); Nathaniel Persily et
al., Introduction to THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013). 
89. See Devins, supra note 43, at 936-37, 936 n.6.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1014-15.
92. See id. at 992-94.
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briefs garnered 480 signers, and Democratic briefs garnered 44
signers, with Democratic signatories limited to party leaders.93
When the statutes were debated, however, this sharp Democrat-
Republican divide did not spill over to a fierce debate about the
scope of congressional authority and, relatedly, what might happen
when the statutes were subject to Supreme Court challenge. For
example, notwithstanding newspaper chatter about Commerce
Clause challenges to the Affordable Care Act, Republican members
focused almost exclusively on policy issues that resonated with
their constituents and virtually ignored the Commerce Clause and
Spending Power issues that were the subject of the NFIB v. Sebelius
litigation.94 For their part, Democrats—who controlled both the
House and Senate—bypassed discussion of potential constitutional
objections.95 None of the twenty reports issued by congressional
committees formally addressed the statute’s constitutionality, and,
with the exception of Patrick Leahy, no congressional Democrat
meaningfully addressed potential constitutional objections to the
statutes in congressional debates.96 In other words, lawmakers
seemed almost single-minded in their focus on policy—largely ignor-
ing issues of congressional power and potential litigation until there
was a constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court.97 More
significant, a lawmaker’s view of congressional power before the
Supreme Court coalesced with a lawmaker’s view of policy, not a
commitment to expanding the power of Congress.98
The Affordable Care Act and partial birth abortion cases, while
extraordinary, are nonetheless emblematic of congressional practice.
On federalism, lawmakers have always let their views on first-order
93. See id.
94. See Neal Devins, Essay, Party Polarization and Judicial Review: Lessons from the Af-
fordable Care Act, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1835-36 (2012). 
95. See id. at 1834-36.
96. See id.
97. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act is an even more extreme example of this phenom-
enon. The Commerce Clause issue was not raised in either legislative debates or congressional
amicus filings. See Neal Devins, How Congress Paved the Way for the Rehnquist Court’s
Federalism Revival: Lessons from the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban, 21 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 461, 468-71 (2007). The sole focus of lawmakers was abortion rights—the
issue that resonated with their constituencies. See id.
98. See Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 131, 134-
37 (2004).
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policy priorities dictate their views on congressional power.99 North-
ern Federalists and Jeffersonians flipped their positions on states’
rights when debating the Louisiana Purchase—with Federalists
fearing a shift of power to the South and Jeffersonians rejecting
claims that the Constitution would need to be amended to authorize
the Purchase.100 During the early twentieth century, pro-labor and
pro-business interests flipped their positions on federal government
authority after the election of the progressive New Deal Congress.101
The list goes on and is not limited to federalism. Recent separation
of powers disputes involving the scope of Congress’s investigatory
powers have seen Democrats and Republicans flip positions.102 The
key variable is whether the President is a Democrat or a Republi-
can—Republicans in Congress embrace broad judicially enforceable
investigatory powers when there is a Democrat but not a Republican
in the White House; the position of Democrats in Congress is the
polar opposite.103
In 2008, House Democrats unanimously backed contempt of Con-
gress citations against White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolten and
former White House counsel Harriet Miers for refusing to turn over
documents pertaining to the George W. Bush Administration’s firing
of U.S. Attorneys;104 three Republicans supported the motion and
other Republicans joined forces to block judicial enforcement of
the subpoena, noting their “deeply held concerns that this suit
99. For a quick tour, see id. For a more detailed treatment of how federalism is typically
overwhelmed by first-order policy preferences, see John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federal-
ism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89,
99-100, 103-05, 121-22 (2004).
100. See FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776-
1876, at 58-62 (2000).
101. See id. at 228-29.
102. Recess appointments are another example. Republicans in Congress fought hard to
limit President Obama’s recess appointment authority, arguing as a bloc before the D.C. Cir-
cuit and Supreme Court. See Neal Devins, Counsel Rests, SLATE (Jan. 13, 2014, 5:55 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/01/the_senate_s_lawyer_
doesn_t_participate_in_important_litigation_against.html [https://perma.cc/H9BX-WATM].
For their part, no Democrat spoke against the President; they bitterly complained about
Republican obstructionism undermining the appointments power and then stood on the side-
line rather than defend congressional prerogatives in the NLRB v. Noel Canning case. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Paul Kane, West Wing Aides Cited for Contempt, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/14/AR2008021402415_pf.html
[https://perma.cc/8HX3-JMB3].
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invites the courts to enter into a political thicket.”105 In 2012, the sit-
uation was reversed. In investigating Obama Attorney General Eric
Holder’s handling of the “Fast and Furious” gun running operation,
the House divided along party lines in holding the Attorney General
in contempt for refusing to turn over documents.106 This time, how-
ever, Democratic members filed an amicus brief arguing against
judicial enforcement of the subpoena.107
None of this is especially surprising, especially in today’s polar-
ized Congress, but it underscores how Congress is essentially disun-
itary and that lawmakers will only come together to assert a broad
shared view of congressional power in those rare cases in which
there is constituency support—so that the personal interests of
lawmakers are served by asserting a broad view of legislative power.
For example, Democrats and Republicans during the Watergate Era
had incentive to stand together on budget reform, war powers, and
limits on DOJ control of criminal investigations of government
officials.108 Today, however, polarization cuts against Democrats
and Republicans pursuing a shared view of congressional power;109
for reasons I will now detail, today’s lawmakers are especially apt
to ignore the courts altogether and especially likely to embrace
position-taking measures that accentuate the ever-growing ideo-
logical divide.
105. See Memorandum Amici Curiae of Representatives John Boehner et al. at 3, Comm.
on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 08-0409 (JDB)).
106. See John Bresnahan & Seung Min Kim, Holder Held in Contempt, POLITICO (June 28,
2012, 5:47 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/06/holder-held-in-contempt-of-congress-
077988 [https://perma.cc/CS6M-H8W2]. The vote was 255-67, with 2 Republicans voting a-
gainst, 17 Democrats voting for, and many Democrats walking out of the House chamber in
protest. Id.
107. See Jerry Seper, House Dems Call for Dismissal of Contempt Lawsuit Against Holder
Over Fast and Furious, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2012/dec/19/house-dems-call-dismissal-contempt-lawsuit-against / [https://perma.cc/F68E-
CJXT].
108. See Devins, Presidential Unilateralism, supra note 15, at 401-05.
109. See id. at 407-11.
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D. Position Taking, Polarization, and Congressional Responses to
Judicial Decisions
Lawmaker incentives clearly cut against Congress staking out a
pro-Congress view of the law in order to advance institutional in-
terests. Likewise, lawmakers have little incentive to embrace one
theory of statutory or constitutional interpretation over another.
Unlike the policy merits of legislation or oversight, interpretative
questions and concerns of institutional power are “generally ab-
stract, unpopular, and fail to capture the imagination of either the
media or the public.”110 Indeed, the only lawmakers who raise con-
stitutional concerns are those opposed to a measure; for others, the
Constitution is “portrayed as an obstacle to a better society.”111
Professor Bruce Peabody’s 2004 survey of lawmaker attitudes to-
wards Court-Congress relations bears out how policy concerns
dominate all else.112 Professor Peabody’s study highlights two relat-
ed phenomena, namely that (1) lawmakers care little about legal
issues unless they concern “local and electorally salient matters,”113
and (2) the overwhelming majority of lawmakers (more than 70
percent) say that courts should give little or no weight to congressio-
nal judgments about the constitutionality of legislation.114
What then of taking the courts into account when judicial review
might undermine political victories? If lawmakers truly care about
policy outcomes, they should care about the ultimate fate of legis-
lation. Relatedly, what happens after a court either strikes a law
down as unconstitutional or interprets a statute at odds with law-
maker preferences? Can Congress respond to a court ruling without
thinking about the interpretive theories that propelled that ruling?
Studies of lawmaker efforts to revamp legislation in response to
constitutional and statutory interpretation decisions are particu-
larly revealing in this regard. Specifically, Professor J. Mitchell
Pickerill’s 2004 study of congressional responses to constitutional
110. See Mikva, supra note 19, at 609-10.
111. See id. at 610.
112. See Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A
Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative Attitudes, 1959-2001, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 127, 166-67
(2004).
113. Id. at 151.
114. Id. at 147-48.
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rulings makes clear that lawmakers are remarkably disengaged
with the courts both before and after judicial review of Congress’s
handiwork.115 Lawmakers care very little about the substance of the
rulings they are responding to and even less about the interpretive
theories that underlie these rulings.116 Based on an evaluation of
congressional responses to federal statutes struck down from 1953
to 1997 and interviews with lawmakers and their staff, Professor
Pickerill assessed lawmaker priorities and the relevance of judicial
invalidations to the pursuit of those priorities.117 Most striking,
Professor Pickerill found that Congress frequently rewrites leg-
islation in response to court overrulings (47 percent);118 Congress
hardly ever challenges the Court’s decisions;119 and Congress
acquiesces to the Court because members can pursue their policy
priorities through alternative legislation.120 The Court and Congress
are both “capable of getting what they want because they want
different things.”121 The Court seeks control of legal standards;
Congress needs some outlet to express its policy preferences.
Professor Pickerill’s findings suggest that Congress can largely
ignore the courts when enacting legislation—the courts might well
approve the measure and, if not, Congress can return to the issue
through amending legislation. Moreover, when amending legisla-
tion, lawmakers need not engage with the courts; they rather
“make[ ] clear concessions to the Court’s decision” by embracing the
same policy through alternative means.122 Lawmakers, in other
words, have next-to-no reason to think about courts when pursuing
favored policies, rewarding constituencies, and bolstering their
115. PICKERILL, supra note 6, at 46-47.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 46. This figure dramatically understates Congress’s willingness to intercede in
response to Supreme Court overrulings. In the vast majority of cases in which Congress does
not intervene, the Court ruling involved “as applied” challenges and, as such, there was not
necessarily any need for legislative intervention—for the executive branch might recalibrate
its enforcement scheme in ways that would cure the constitutional infirmity. See id. at 43-45.
119. See id. at 49.
120. See id. at 54.
121. Whittington, supra note 19, at 1146 (reviewing Pickerill’s evidence and finding it
persuasive).
122. PICKERILL, supra note 6, at 49.
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prospects for reelection.123 Interviews with lawmakers and staff back
up these conclusions; here is a sampling:
• “Policy issues first, how do you get a consensus to pass the bill,
six other things, then constitutionality.”124
• “When I go home and talk to my constituents, they ask me to
help solve problems in Congress. They don’t ask if it’s constitu-
tional. They want common sense.”125
• “We know that the Senator is not going to go home and not get
re-elected because he voted for legislation which was later
struck down as unconstitutional.”126
Congressional overrides of statutory decisions tell a similar story.
A study of 275 overrides from 1967 to 2011 reveals that Congress
“does not override because of statutory method (e.g. textualism or
purposivism).”127 Just like interpretive theories of congressional
power, theories of statutory interpretation are one step removed
from the underlying policy controversy and lack political salience.128
123. The only potential exception is when courts truly foreclose first-order policy pri-
orities—preventing all alternative legislative mechanisms so that the only available way to
advance lawmaker policy preferences is to compel a change in Court doctrine. See
Whittington, supra note 17, at 493-95. This is extremely unlikely to occur on structural
questions like federalism and separation of powers as there almost always is an alternative
mechanism available to Congress. See Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining
Why Senate Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making But Not the Rehnquist
Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1307, 1314-15 (2002).
124. PICKERILL, supra note 6, at 134 (quoting former Democratic Senator).
125. Id. (quoting former Republican Representative).
126. Id. at 135 (quoting Senate Republican legislative director).
127. See Nourse, supra note 42, at 206-07 (emphasis omitted) (discussing findings of
Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 20).
128. The one possible exception is the court-centric Judiciary Committees. See infra Part
I.E. In 2016, for example, the House Judiciary Committee approved the Separation of Powers
Restoration Act (SOPRA), legislation that would shift power away from executive agencies
and to the courts by vitiating so-called Chevron deference. See H.R. REP. NO. 114-622, at 1-2
(2016). This shift arguably limits legislative prerogatives in that statutory override studies
suggest a close working relationship between courts and agencies on interpretive questions.
See Nourse, supra note 42, at 213-14. On the other hand, limiting executive power is a boon
to congressional prerogatives during periods of divided government. See Frost, supra note 13,
at 931.
The 2016 SOPRA is telling for another reason. House Republicans uniformly backed the
measure (239 votes for and none against) and all but 1 of 172 voting Democrats opposed the
measure. See Office of the Clerk, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 416, U.S. HOUSE REP-
RESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2016/roll416.xml [https://perma.cc/ZE6L-FLS7]. The
reason: the bill was pushed by Republicans in an effort to condemn the Obama Administration
for pushing the boundaries of executive power. See Press Release, Sen. Mike Lee, Senate,
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Most notably, the Court’s shift away from pro-Congress theories of
interpretation that make use of legislative history has not caused a
stir; as noted, I could find no evidence on congressional efforts to
mandate the use of legislative history.129 Instead, Congress over-
rides to achieve policy goals. For example, when Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (overriding several Supreme Court
opinions), an unusual statutory provision directed courts to rely
exclusively on an “interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137
Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) ... as
legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this
Act.”130 More typically, Congress does not formally take the Court
into account. Most overrides are so-called policy-updating overrides
which update public law years or decades after a Supreme Court
opinion.131 Even though these overrides negate “bushels of Supreme
Court opinions,” the Court is a big player in these stories—as the
focus is strictly updating policy, not correcting judicial mistakes.132
Policy too is the focus in “restorative” overrides that directly tar-
get disappointing Supreme Court cases. Most (around 70 percent)
of these overrides are triggered by executive agencies and the
DOJ, responding to cases in which agency views were more in line
with lawmaker preferences than judicial opinions.133 Over the past
twenty-five years, and especially since 2000, however, Congress
House Leaders Introduce Bill to Restore Regulatory Accountability Through Judicial Re-
view (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/3/senate-house-leaders-
introduce-bill-to-restore-regulatory-accountability-through-judicial-review [https://perma.cc/
5EED-YCY3]. Ironically, Republican backers of the measure did not think that judicial
supremacy in interpreting statutes violated our system of checks and balances. See, e.g., id.
Instead, the focal point of this partisan debate was the lawfulness of Obama initiatives; the
authority of Congress to interpret was never in play. See id. Likewise, the fact that the Senate
never pursued this measure further highlights that its purpose was to highlight Republican
complaints against the Obama Administration and not to reform judicial interpretations of
federal statutes.
129. See supra text accompanying note 78; see also Frost, supra note 13, at 968 (noting
dominance of anti-Congress theories and suggesting that Congress participate in litigation
advancing pro-Congress theories).
130. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).
For further discussion, see Robert Pear, With Rights Act Comes Fight to Clarify Congress’s
Intent, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/18/us/with-rights-act-
comes-fight-to-clarify-congress-s-intent.html [https://perma.cc/H2WE-ENUT].
131. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1319-20.
132. See id. at 1320.
133. See id. at 1321.
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rarely overturned Supreme Court statutory rulings by putting
earlier understandings of the law back into effect.134 The reason:
lawmakers in today’s polarized Congress increasingly are at odds
about preferred policies, and lawmakers cannot work together in
bipartisan ways to check the Court on divisive policy questions.135
In this way, polarization further facilitates judicial supremacy.136
Polarization facilitates judicial supremacy in other ways. It
makes it more likely that lawmakers will emphasize party-coor-
dinated messages without consideration of institutional interests,
including potential judicial review.137 It shifts congressional re-
sources away from committees and to party leaders—so much so
that committee hearings related to constitutional and statutory
interpretation have become the province of the court-centric Ju-
diciary Committees.138 Polarization also means that there are next
to no moderates in either party and that all Republicans are
conservative and all Democrats liberal.139 There is no need for
lawmakers to pursue policies of moderation or engage in bipartisan
compromise.140 Members of your party largely agree with you;
members of the opposition party largely disagree with you.141
134. See Hasen, supra note 20, at 209 (noting an average of 12 overrides per year from 1975
to 1990; 5.8 per year from 1991 to 2000; and 2.8 per year from 2001 to 2012).
135. See id. at 228-42.
136. See Adam Liptak, In Congress’s Paralysis, a Mightier Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES:
SIDEBAR (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/21/us/politics/supreme-court-gains-
power-from-paralysis-of-congress.html [https://perma.cc/3H9H-W29N].
137. See C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED 217, 219-20 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001).
138. See Devins, Party Polarization, supra note 15, at 762-63.
139. Today, the ideological distance between the two parties is greater than it has ever
been. See Sean M. Theriault, The Case of the Vanishing Moderates: Party Polarization in the
Modern Congress 6 figs.1 & 2 (Sept. 23, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), https://msu.edu/
~rohde/Theriault.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TH6-XJNW]; Keith T. Poole, The Polarization of the
Congressional Parties, POLARIZED AM. (Jan. 30, 2016), http://polarizedamerica.com/political_
polarization_2015.htm [https://perma.cc/2EWK-GGJZ]. On the absence of moderates, see
Hasen, supra note 20, at 233-42; Theriault, supra, at 3.
140. When Congress was ideologically diverse, lawmakers routinely pursued bipartisan
measures and acted in bipartisan ways. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Essay, The Academic Expert
Before Congress: Observations and Lessons from Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J.
1525, 1543 (2005) (discussing bipartisan approaches to witness lists at congressional hear-
ings); Richard K. Neumann, Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political Weapon,
34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 161, 255-56 (2007).
141. For this very reason, there has been a dramatic rise in party-line voting and amicus
filings. For example, no Republican voted for the Affordable Care Act, judicial nominees are
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Because intraparty agreement is so high, party members are in-
creasingly willing to delegate authority to like-minded party
leaders. “As the views of members within the ... party become more
alike, the costs of [members] delegating positive agenda power [to
leadership] diminishes relative to the potential benefits.”142 By em-
bracing party leadership and party-crafted messages, lawmakers
invest less in policy and more in fundraising, constituency service,
and other activities related to reelection.143
The shift in power to leadership is consequential in other ways.
Leaders bolster their claim of power by cutting committee resources
and otherwise shifting power away from committee chairs.144 For
example, by setting term limits on committee service and taking
greater control of naming the committee chair, leadership rewards
party loyalty (including fundraising) when staffing committees.145
increasingly subject to party-line votes, and congressional amicus briefs are increasingly
single-party briefs. See Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Congress and the Politics of
Judicial Appointments, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 137, at 297, 302-04 (explain-
ing that federal court of appeals nominees increasingly are subject to party-line votes);
Devins, supra note 43, at 943-44 (noting rise in single-party amicus briefs); Robert Pear,
Senate Passes Health Care Overhaul on Party-Line Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/25/health/policy/25health.html [https://perma.cc/5SR5-EALE] (ex-
plaining passage of Affordable Care Act); see also John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde,
Congressional Committees in a Continuing Partisan Era, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217,
232-37 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 9th ed. 2009) [hereinafter CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED, 9th ed.] (discussing rise of minority party filibuster).
142. David W. Rohde et al., Parties, Committees, and Pivots: A Reassessment of the
Literature on Congressional Organization 12 (Aug. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://
research.allacademic.com/ [https://perma.cc/99MU-FW6L] (select “Titles” from the drop down
box and search for “Parties, Committees, and Pivots” from the “Quick Search” box on the main
page; then find the APSA presentation and follow the link entitled “Application/PDF”); see
also STEVEN S. SMITH, PARTY INFLUENCE IN CONGRESS 120 (2007) (noting that “party influence
varies with party polarization”).
143. See KING, supra note 52, at 49.
144. For general treatments of the balance of power between committee chairs and party
leaders, see BARBARA SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, LEADERS, AND LAWMAKING: THE U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE POSTREFORM ERA 163-66 (1995); SMITH, supra note 142, at 116-
18; Aldrich & Rohde, supra note 141, at 233-34.
145. For discussions of House Speaker Newt Gingrich’s efforts to centralize power after the
1995 Republican takeover of Congress, see CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH,
COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 48 (3d ed. 1997); Aldrich & Rohde, supra note 141, at 223. For
discussions of how House Democrats too coordinated power after their 2007 takeover, see
Steven S. Smith & Gerald Gamm, The Dynamics of Party Government in Congress, in
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, 9th ed., supra note 141, at 141, 160-61. For discussions of how
polarization and the related shift to party leadership affected the Senate as well as the House,
see DEERING & SMITH, supra, at 51-52; SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUSES
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Moreover, reductions in committee staff result in greater attention
to first-order policy priorities and less attention to second-order
concerns, including the constitutionality of legislation and other
matters associated with potential judicial review of legislative
action. Indeed, my 2011 study of committee consideration of con-
stitutional questions revealed that—with the important exception
of the Judiciary Committees—committee consideration of constitu-
tional questions was inversely related to party polarization,
declining starting around 1980 and declining precipitously from
1995 to 2009.146 During the less polarized 1970-1980 period, 54
percent of constitutional hearings took place outside the Judiciary
Committee; during the highly polarized 1995-2009 period, that
percentage dropped by half—to 28 percent.147
The shift in power to leadership and related coalescing of party
views also results in each party seeking political advantage by
diminishing the power of the other party. Consider, for example, the
willingness of each party to investigate and oversee the policies of
the opposition party President but not Presidents of their own
party.148 This behavior weakens Congress by facilitating disunitari-
ness and reliance on the courts to adjudicate interparty disputes.149
It also results in each party’s embrace of so-called message pol-
itics—party efforts to use the legislative process to make symbolic
statements to voters and other constituents.150 Indeed, party mem-
bers may even trade off preferred policies and cast strategic votes
“to enhance their party’s brand name with various constituen-
cies.”151
This emphasis on party messaging, combined with the related
changes in the committee structure and lawmaker priorities, has
resulted in a severe decline in major legislation that requires the
IN NATIONAL POLICY MAKING 87-92 (1998); FRANCES E. LEE, BEYOND IDEOLOGY: POLITICS,
PRINCIPLES, AND PARTISANSHIP IN THE U.S. SENATE 174-80 (2009).
146. See Devins, Party Polarization, supra note 15, at 780 n.195. 
147. See id. at 751-52.
148. See Devins, Presidential Unilateralism, supra note 15, at 409-10.
149. See id.
150. See Evans, supra note 137, at 219. In particular, Republicans and Democrats look to
party leaders to coordinate a message—rather than allow committee leaders the power to set
the legislative agenda. See id. at 226-27.
151. See Frances E. Lee, How Party Polarization Affects Governance, 18 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 261, 265 (2015).
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cooperation of both parties.152 It has also resulted in a decline in
legislation overturning Supreme Court statutory interpretation
decisions and restoring earlier understandings of the law.153 More
generally, it has resulted in a de-emphasis on legislative accom-
plishment (when lawmakers take credit for having the government
do something) and an emphasis, instead, on so-called position tak-
ing.154 Position taking can instead be defined as “the public enuncia-
tion of a judgmental statement on anything likely to be of interest
to political actors. The statement may take the form of a roll call
vote.”155 Position taking is an “effort at image adjustment [that] can
take many forms, including press releases, letters to constituents,
paid advertising, public appearances, interviews, writings, roll call
votes, bill sponsorships, floor speeches, and activity at legislative
hearings.”156
Position taking allows lawmakers to “take credit for voting the
right way on the issue,”157 and therefore, the political benefit is not
contingent on a law actually being passed by Congress or upheld by
the courts. Indeed, judicial invalidations can prove beneficial, for
they create new opportunities for lawmakers to return to the issue
and consider alternative measures. Consider, for example, the Gun-
Free School Zones Act invalidated by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Lopez.158 Lawmakers never thought about the courts when
enacting the measure.159 Lawmakers were able to take a position on
protecting children, regardless of whether the Court upheld the law.
After the statute was invalidated, lawmakers could return to the
issue and enact alternative legislation—again, reaping the benefits
of taking a position against crime. In so doing, the lawmakers could
152. See Hasen, supra note 20, at 240-41.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 118-28.
154. For an excellent summary of the differences between credit claiming and position
taking, see Whittington, supra note 17, at 512-13.
155. DAVID R. MAYHEW, PARTIES AND POLICIES: HOW THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WORKS
36 (2008).
156. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 134.
157. Whittington, supra note 17, at 513.
158. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (describing the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
159. See PICKERILL, supra note 6, at 101-02. Lawmakers did not make any findings that
the law impacted commerce until after a federal court of appeals invalidated the statute as
outside the commerce power—findings that were attached to unrelated legislation and based
on no evidence. See id. at 150.
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simultaneously reap position-taking benefits while backing judicial
power to limit Congressional power.160 More generally, “[e]nhancing
the judicial authority to define and enforce constitutional meaning
can ease the legislative policy conscience, while allowing legislators
to reap the electoral gains of position taking.”161
E. Wrapping Up
Lawmakers place policy, constituency, and reelection ahead of
institutional goals. In today’s polarized Congress, lawmakers also
place their party ahead of institutional goals. These divisions within
Congress cut against Congress’s power to persuade the courts and
Congress’s power to formally take issue with court decision-making.
Correspondingly, lawmakers pursue favored policies without regard
of potential judicial review. And when lawmakers act in response to
court decisions, there is little agonizing over potential judicial re-
view.
Let me close this Part by reiterating one of the central claims of
this Article: Lawmaker incentives facilitate judicial supremacy and,
correspondingly, lawmakers acquiesce to judicial supremacy. In
particular, the prospects of judicial review and the theories of
interpretation utilized by courts are low salience matters to most
lawmakers—so much so that judicial review is rarely taken into
account. That, however, does not mean that lawmakers support
judicial supremacy. Occasions when lawmakers declare that a
question of constitutional or statutory interpretation should be
settled by the courts are rare.162 Indeed, a survey of 137 congres-
sional staffers involved in the legislative drafting process revealed
that most drafters do not want courts to fill in gaps in statutory
meaning—91 percent said gaps should be filled in by agencies
as compared to 39 percent who also looked to courts.163 Equally
160. See id. at 37-38; Devins, supra note 123, at 1316-17.
161. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 139.
162. On rare occasion, lawmakers formally embrace judicial supremacy. For example, expe-
dited review provisions are sometimes utilized for the very purpose of kicking an issue to the
Supreme Court. See Devins, supra note 1, at 442-44.
163. See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 10, at 774. Based on strict party-line voting on pro-
posed 2016 legislation regarding judicial deference to agency interpretations, there may now
be a Republican-Democrat divide on this question (with Democrats backing agency deference
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significant, most of that 39 percent worked for entities removed
from the actual implementation of the law, that is, removed from
the actual policy making central to most members—40 percent were
from the court-centric Offices of Legislative Counsel, 23 percent
were from the court-centric Judiciary Committees, and 10 percent
were from other committees that do not oversee agencies.164 
Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that courts—the Su-
preme Court in particular—feel that they need not take Congress
into account when interpreting statutes or the Constitution.165 Law-
makers and their staff may not prefer a regime of judicial suprem-
acy, but Congress will not resist judicial supremacy.166 As I will now
show in Part II, the very offices and committees in Congress most
likely to pay attention to courts embrace broad judicial authority.
Specifically, while most committees and members eschew courts in
pursuing policy, constituency, reelection, and party objectives, the
committees and offices who oversee judicial matters have incentive
to embrace broad views of judicial power. Part II will make this
point by examining the Judiciary Committees, the Offices of
Legislative Counsel and the American Law Division of the Congres-
sional Research Service, and the House and Senate offices of legal
counsel.
and Republicans backing judicial supremacy). See supra note 128. On the other hand, the
party-line vote may have had nothing to do with rules of statutory construction and every-
thing to do with Republican efforts to cast doubt on the legality of Obama initiatives. See
supra note 128.
164. See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 10, at 774.
165. The Supreme Court increasingly embraces this view in both constitutional and
statutory cases. In constitutional cases, the Court increasingly avoids the avoidance canon in
order to raise issues not presented by the case. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Essay, On
Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 667
(2012). In statutory cases, the Supreme Court is increasingly likely to declare statutory
language clear rather than defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. See Cass
R. Sunstein, The Catch in the Obamacare Opinion, BLOOMBERG: VIEW (June 25, 2015, 2:22
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-06-25/the-catch-in-the-obamacare-opinion
[https://perma.cc/K88H-7964]. For further discussion, see supra Part I.D.
166. See supra Part I.C.
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II. INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES
The institutional design choices made by lawmakers reflect
lawmaker incentives. Unlike the unitary executive, lawmakers do
not advance their preferred policies through coordinated legal
arguments that expand congressional power.167 As Part I makes
clear, lawmakers rarely think of congressional power; indeed, the
individual interests of lawmakers are sometimes served by judi-
cially imposed limits on Congress’s powers. Congressional organiza-
tion reflects Congress-executive differences. Unlike the unitary
executive, there are no offices in Congress—like the DOJ’s Office of
Legal Counsel—tasked to advance pro-Congress understandings of
the law, nor is there a DOJ or Office of Management and Budget to
coordinate a unified pro-Congress understanding of regulatory and
legal policy priorities.168 The President has incentive to have such
offices because his policy interests are advanced through coordi-
nated pro-executive enforcement strategies.169 In contrast, Congress
neither executes the law nor presents an organized, cohesive view
of congressional authority.170 By its very nature, “[c]ongressional
organization leads to fragmentation.”171 Reform proposals highlight
that Congress is limited by the very fact that lawmakers pursue
“legislative” priorities—but reform proposals go nowhere because
lawmakers have no reason to constrain themselves when pursuing
policies that cut against Congress’s institutional interests.172
167. See supra Part I.A.
168. See supra Part I.C.
169. See Devins, Presidential Unilateralism, supra note 15, at 399-400.
170. See supra Part I.A.
171. Robert A. Katzmann, The American Legislative Process as a Signal, 9 J. PUB. POL’Y
287, 291 (1989). 
172. For example, Beth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule proposed the establishment of a
legislative office that would—akin to the Office of Legal Counsel—develop pro-Congress
theories of the Constitution and prepare “constitutional impact” statements on proposed legis-
lation. Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 1313-19. According to Garrett and Vermeule, “If
Congress wants to step out of the shadows of the judicial and executive branches with regard
to constitutional determinations, it must establish an equivalent set of experts.” Id. at 1314.
Proposals like this, however, are the province of law professors—not members of Congress
who have incentives to trade off Congress’s institutional interests. See Devins, supra note 43,
at 935. For another proposal advocating broader congressional involvement in judicial pro-
ceedings, see Frost, supra note 13, at 967.
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This Part will examine legislative drafting, congressional over-
sight of DOJ legal arguments, and the occasional efforts of the
House and Senate counsel to advance congressional prerogatives in
court. In so doing, I will show how institutional structures facilitate
judicial supremacy. In particular, these structures reflect the fact
that lawmakers pay scant attention to courts and delegate power on
court-related questions to committees and offices that embrace ju-
dicial power.173 To a lesser extent, these structures also highlight
polarization in today’s Congress and how lawmakers are often at
odds with each other on the scope of congressional power.174
A. Legislative Drafting
Legislative drafting is not pursued in a uniform manner. Power
is not clearly delineated among members. Committees operate in an
ad hoc manner, and there is nothing resembling precedent that
governs theories of statutory interpretation; there is no need to
coordinate a broader congressional agenda.175 In contrast to Office
of Management and Budget regulatory review,176 there is no re-
quirement that lawmakers work with either of the two offices that
could represent some type of coordinating institution within the leg-
islature: the American Law Division of the Congressional Research
Service and the Offices of Legislative Counsel. These offices are not
required to participate in legislative drafting; correspondingly, and
unlike the Office of Legal Counsel, they are not bound by internal
pro-Congress precedent nor do they have any institutional incentive
to assert broad legislative authority to the courts.177 As I will soon
discuss, the incentives of these offices are not to expand the bound-
aries of legislative power, but to embrace judicial supremacy. More
173. See infra Part II.A.
174. See infra Part II.B.
175. See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 109-11
(2015).
176. See Arthur Fraas, Observations on OIRA’s Policies and Procedures, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
79, 80 (2011) (discussing efforts of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs to coord-
inate executive policy making through mandatory regulatory review of draft agency rules).
177. On the role of precedent in Office of Legal Counsel decision-making, see Bradley &
Morrison, supra note 31, at 1133. On Office of Legal Counsel incentives to expand presidential
power, see Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
437, 463-64 (1993).
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significant, congressional drafters are far more concerned with a-
gency interpretations than court interpretations.178 Without any
authority to argue pro-Congress theories of statutory or constitu-
tional interpretation before the courts, lawmakers, committee staff,
and the Offices of Legislative Counsel are much more interested in
directing agency action than in legal theories that are one step
removed from policy making.
More generally, the mechanics of legislative drafting mitigate
against formal consideration of the courts and potential judicial
review by members and staffers. Members of Congress “are not
drafters [of legislation] but rather decisionmakers. They are man-
agers of a mini-bureaucracy who set the direction for policy and
sometimes wade into the details of policy, but who rarely get into
the technical work of legislative drafting.”179 Outside of the Judi-
ciary Committees, congressional staff do not typically draft legisla-
tion.180 Like the members or committees they represent, staffers are
far more focused on broad policy goals than in the specific language
of the bill.181 The actual drafting of legislation is largely pursued by
the nonpartisan Offices of Legislative Counsel.182
Throughout the drafting process, members and staff focus on pol-
icy goals, including agency implementation. Reflecting the fact that
agencies and committees are in close contact regarding the drafting
and implementing of legislation, agencies participate in legislative
drafting, and members sometimes purposefully include ambiguous
statutory language to create levers whereby they can pressure
178. See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 10, at 769-70, 774.
179. Sitaraman, supra note 175, at 90-91 (footnote omitted).
180. For a study of Judiciary Committee staff participation in legislative drafting, see
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional
Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 582-83 (2002). Judiciary Committee staff suggest that they
frequently prepare a draft of legislation before turning over the bill to Legislative Counsel for
fine-tuning. See id. at 591. This is a far more active role than reported by other staffers sur-
veyed by Bressman and Gluck. See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 10, at 740 (“99% is drafted
by Legislative Counsel. Most legislation is an amorphous concept given by member or
staffer.”). Likewise, Judiciary Committee staff seemed to take into account “what a court will
do with certain language.” Nourse & Schacter, supra, at 601. For additional discussion of the
Judiciary Committee, see infra Part II.B.
181. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 180, at 607.
182. Bressman & Gluck, supra note 10, at 740. Contact with the Offices of Legislative
Counsel may be initiated when the bill is first being drafted or at any other point in the
deliberative process. See Katzmann, supra note 171, at 288-89.
1528 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1495
agencies to pursue member priorities through the implementation
of statutes.183 Oversight hearings, confirmations, and appropriations
also result in constant dialogue between members, staffers, and
agency officials.184 Unlike agencies, courts are absent from legisla-
tive drafting and implementation. The DOJ is the government’s
voice in court proceedings, and prohibitions of advisory opinions
keep judges far removed from the lawmaking process.185 And while
Congress does oversee the judiciary through, among other things, its
exceptions and appropriations powers, there is little to no direct
communication between Congress and the courts.186
For their part, the Offices of Legislative Counsel seek to actualize
the policy goals of client members, committees, and staffers. A
survey by Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman of 137
congressional staffers underscores that policy concerns are the near-
exclusive concern of members and staffers.187 A survey of fifty-four
agency officials by Professors Jarrod Shobe revealed that agency
officials often participate in the drafting process to ensure that
183. On the role of agencies in drafting, see Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 20, at
1448-49; Sitaraman, supra note 175, at 103-09. See generally, Jarrod Shobe, Agencies as
Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of Agencies in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). For a discussion of how members draft statutes in such a
way that they can later push agencies to do their bidding, see Neomi Rao, Administrative
Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1505
(2015). For a related discussion of how staffers are more apt to delegate authority to agencies
they have jurisdiction over, see Bressman & Gluck, supra note 10, at 754. For a discussion of
House Republican efforts to expand judicial review and limit agency control of statutory
meaning, see supra note 128.
184. For a detailing of the multifarious ways Congress asserts its interests in negotiations
with the executive over information access requests, see Devins, A Modest Proposal, supra
note 18, at 109, 111-13.
185. For additional discussion of DOJ control of government litigation, see infra Part II.B.2.
For a discussion of the Framers’ rejection of a Council of Revision that would allow lawmakers
to seek advisory opinions from the judiciary, see John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as
Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 2000-02 (2011). 
186. For a helpful inventory of ways that Congress and the courts do interface, see MARK
C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 77-104 (2009). On the need to improve communications between
Congress and the courts, see generally JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL
COMITY, supra note 58.
187. See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 10, at 740. For a discussion of the methodology
used in the survey, see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part
I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 919-24 (2013). 
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staffers and agency officials agree ex ante on statutory meaning.188
On the other hand, questions of potential judicial review are largely
ignored by members and staffers.189 Instead, these questions are the
province of the Offices of Legislative Counsel.190 And while attorney
drafters in these offices see “their primary interpretive relationship
as one with agencies, not courts,”191 they are also aware of theories
of statutory construction, of relevant case law, and of potential
constitutional challenges.192 On occasion, the Offices of Legislative
Counsel will seek legal advice from the American Law Division of
the Congressional Research Service; more typically, when a poten-
tial constitutional issue is flagged, the Offices of Legislative Counsel
will encourage members and staffers to seek legal advice from the
American Law Division.193
The organizational structure and norms of the American Law
Division and Offices of Legislative Counsel do not facilitate pro-
Congress views of the law. There is no mechanism in the offices to
develop or adhere to legal theories that advance Congress’s insti-
tutional interests in either statutory or constitutional cases. For
example, the Offices of Legislative Counsel are fragmented in ways
that undermine coordination; like congressional committees with
competing jurisdiction, attorneys in the Offices of Legislative Coun-
sel are assigned to specific subject areas.194 They work with and
188. For a discussion of Shobe’s survey methodology, see Shobe, supra note 183 (manu-
script at 11-13).
189. See Shobe, supra note 10, at 831-32.
190. See id.
191. Bressman & Gluck, supra note 10, at 767. Conversations I have had with Legislative
Counsel attorneys echoed this point: that agencies are far more important than courts to the
staffers and members who are the clients of the Office of Legislative Counsel. Agency
representatives often meet with staffers and Legislative Counsel attorneys to ensure that
agencies will adhere to legislative preferences.
192. See Shobe, supra note 10, at 831-32. At the same time, legislative drafters are more
interested in clearly expressing Congress’s policy goals and do not “always draft with courts’
behavior specifically in mind.” Id. at 832; see also Gluck & Bressman, supra note 187, at 943-
44. For a somewhat competing view, see Nourse & Schacter, supra note 180, at 603 (noting
that their interviews with Legislative Counsel lawyers showed substantial expertise in court
statutory drafting as well as efforts to draft legislation with an eye toward federal court
decision-making).
193. See Fisher, supra note 10, at 68-73; Shobe, supra note 10, at 834-43.
194. See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 10, at 746-47; see also Peter M. Goodloe, Simpli-
fication—A Federal Legislative Perspective, 105 DICK. L. REV. 247, 248 (2001) (describing
legislative drafting as “trying to build a house with no general contractor, [rather] just a
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advance the priorities of their clients (committees and members);
they do not coordinate with each other nor do they seek to advance
a uniform view of legislative prerogatives.195 Correspondingly, there
is no such thing as precedent, so staffers in these offices seek to
codify policy preferences, even if that comes at the expense of pro-
Congress theories of interpretation.196 Attorney-client confidentiality
in both offices also operates to shield lawmakers and committees
from having draft legislation or legal opinions shared with other
members.197 Members opposed to legislation sometimes seek out
legal opinions from the American Law Division and submit those
opinions for publication in the Congressional Record when they
identify limits to congressional power.198 
Equally significant, the structures and incentives of these offices
cut in favor of a strict adherence to Supreme Court precedent. Most
staffers spend twenty-five or more years working in these offices
and are attracted to work in offices that have a strong reputation for
serving lawmakers and for being nonpartisan.199 Indeed, American
Law Division attorneys are instructed to consider both sides of legal
questions and thereby not formally embrace pro-Congress under-
standings of the law.200 Relatedly, there are strong incentives for
these offices to see the Supreme Court as the last word on questions
of constitutional interpretation and theories of statutory interpreta-
tion. In part, adherence to Supreme Court precedent fuels the non-
partisan reputation of these offices.201 These offices have no interest
bunch of subcontractors trying to coordinate with each other”).
195. In sharp contrast, the principal argument in favor of DOJ control of agency litigation
is to ensure consistent positions in court and a pro-executive understanding of the law. Cf.
Devins & Herz, supra note 62, at 559-61.
196. There is a drafting guide, but it is not “comprehensive”; instead, “the drafters
themselves hold the offices’ expertise.” Shobe, supra note 10, at 824-25.
197. See id. at 828-29. Legislative Counsel attorneys cannot tell members or staffers about
the efforts of other lawmakers to pursue similar legislation—even if to foster cooperation
between members and committees pursuing similar objectives. Id. Conversations I have had
with Legislative Counsel staffers also highlighted the import of confidentiality.
198. See id. at 838-39. American Law Division work product is also subject to attorney-
client privilege and cannot be shared without the consent of the member who requests it. See
id. at 841. On the other hand, that member is free to do what she sees fit. See id.
199. See id. at 825.
200. See id. at 841-42. I have heard this numerous times from American Law Division
attorneys and analysts who work for other Congressional Research Service divisions.
201. Cf. id. at 818, 834, 841 (discussing the bipartisan reputations of the Office of Leg-
islative Counsel and the American Law Division).
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in staking out contested pro-Congress views of the law; unlike the
unitary executive, Congress is disunitary and pro-Congress posi-
tions might be resisted by lawmakers who oppose legislation on pol-
icy grounds.202 The status of these lawyers is somewhat hinged to
the status of the courts; for example, the work of American Law
Division lawyers is very much tied to the Supreme Court imposing
checks on Congress—checks that can be discerned through an
analysis of case law.203 On constitutional questions, moreover, staf-
fers in both offices have incentive to give legal advice that will result
in the upholding of federal legislation.204 Consequently, potential
judicial limits to congressional power are embraced, not chal-
lenged.205 Likewise, on statutory matters, there is no interest in
revisiting Supreme Court doctrine that limited the use of legislative
history.206
None of this is surprising. Congress is disunified and does not
push for pro-Congress views of the law. Lawmakers, in general, do
not care about potential judicial invalidations so long as there are
available mechanisms to express their policy preferences.207 Law-
makers, in other words, place no pressure on congressional offices
to embrace a pro-Congress view of the law; indeed, the incentives of
attorneys in the Offices of Legislative Counsel and the American
Law Division favor both judicial supremacy and broad readings of
judicial limits on congressional power.208 Judicial supremacy fosters
202. See Moe & Howell, supra note 17, at 861 (discussing congressional members’ need to
please their constituencies at the expense of bipartisanship).
203. See Shobe, supra note 10, at 842 (noting that American Law Division lawyers are
“acutely concerned with Supreme Court decisions”).
204. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 21, at 517-18 (discussing the Office of Legal Counsel
opinion stating that the DOJ should bring plausible arguments to allow the court to uphold
a statute). Not surprisingly, attorneys in both offices have told me that they looked to
Supreme Court precedent to assess likely judicial outcomes, and there was no interest in
examining alternative theories that might expand the boundaries of congressional power.
205. See Devins, Party Polarization, supra note 15, at 764 (noting that lawmakers are
increasingly willing to acquiesce to Supreme Court authority to invalidate legislation).
206. See Frost, supra note 13, at 926 (noting that Congress has stood by while the Court
diminishes the role of legislative history in statutory interpretation).
207. See Whittington, supra note 17, at 512 (noting that members of Congress have the
strongest reaction to Court decisions when the political costs of the decision are the greatest).
208. See Shobe, supra note 10, at 831-32, 840 (discussing the awareness of judicial stat-
utory interpretation on the part of the Office of Legislative Council and the American Law
Division).
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bipartisan norms; broad readings mitigate against potential judicial
invalidation of lawmaker preferences.
B. Congress in Court
Congress’s disinterest in the courts, including potential judicial
invalidations of federal law, is also revealed in Congress’s partici-
pation in legal proceedings—indirectly through its oversight of the
DOJ and directly through legal filings by the House and Senate
counsel. First, by both centralizing litigation authority in the DOJ
and leaving it to the court-centric Judiciary Committee to oversee
the DOJ, most lawmakers have washed their hands of any over-
sight responsibilities involving legal arguments made in court.209
Second, by acquiescing to DOJ refusals to defend federal statutes
in court, Congress further signals its acceptance of DOJ control of
legal arguments—including arguments that directly cut against
congressional power.210 Third, congressional norms and institutional
structures further reinforce DOJ control. In particular, when the
DOJ advances a limited view of congressional power, the House and
Senate offices of legal counsel are not effective counterweights to
the DOJ.211 This is particularly true today; party polarization cuts
against meaningful efforts for institutional counsel to advance a
pro-Congress vision of the law before the courts.212
1. Agency Litigation Authority
Outside of the Judiciary Committees, lawmakers and their staffs
are generally uninterested in legal arguments.213 Their focus is
direct influence on policy making through the drafting of statutes
and through oversight of agency decision-making.214 For these
lawmakers, the question of who controls litigation authority barely
registers; legal arguments made in court are too abstract and too
indirect to most lawmakers. What matters is shaping the direction
209. See infra Part II.B.1.
210. See infra Part II.B.2.
211. See infra Part II.B.3.
212. See Devins & Herz, supra note 14, at 221.
213. The analysis in this paragraph draws from my previous work. See id. at 220-21.
214. See id.
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of agency policy making through legislation, hearings, and investi-
gations.215 Furthermore, post-1995 cutbacks in congressional staff
have resulted in increasing committee attention to policy questions;
questions about the underlying constitutionality of legislation and
legal arguments made in court are increasingly considered a luxury
by understaffed policy-focused committees.216
In sharp contrast, there are strong advocates of centralization of
litigation authority in the DOJ—most notably the executive branch
and the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. For the White
House, the coordination of legal policy making bolsters presidential
control of the administrative state.217 Before President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt issued an executive order transferring litigation
authority from agency solicitors to the Attorney General,218 there
was no attempt to coordinate legal policy making and agency solic-
itors were more beholden to oversight committees in Congress than
to the White House.219 Recognizing that this diffusion of litigation
authority undermined his efforts to consolidate power and advance
a coordinated vision of executive power and policy, Roosevelt made
DOJ control of litigation and the related strengthening of the DOJ
centerpieces of his efforts to reorganize government.220 Correspond-
ingly, Roosevelt and other presidents have seen the Attorney Gen-
eral as a close political ally; unlike most agency and department
heads, who typically do not have strong ties to the President before
their appointment, the Attorney General is usually active in the
President’s personal and political life.221 
The DOJ and the Judiciary Committees that oversee the DOJ are
also strong advocates for DOJ control of litigation. The power and
prestige of the DOJ is tied to its litigation authority and, relatedly,
the DOJ fends off agency rivals by advancing a pro-President legal
policy agenda.222 For stunningly similar reasons, the Judiciary
215. See id. at 221.
216. See Devins, Party Polarization, supra note 15, at 782-83.
217. See, e.g., Devins & Herz, supra note 14, at 219.
218. See Exec. Order No. 6166, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 901 (2012).
219. See Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 256-
58 (1996) (book review) (discussing Roosevelt’s reorganization of the DOJ).
220. See id. at 260-61. 
221. See Devins & Herz, supra note 14, at 219.
222. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 31, at 1105-06, 1105 n.32; see also Devins &
Prakash, supra note 21, at 538-39 (noting that the DOJ enhances its autonomy by embracing
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Committees embrace DOJ control and are fierce advocates for
centralization.223 The power of the Judiciary Committees is very
much moored to the power of the agency they supervise, the DOJ.224
Consequently, when other congressional committees have sought to
enhance their own authority by shifting litigation authority away
from the DOJ and to the agency overseen by that committee, the
Judiciary Committees fight back and seek to preserve power in the
DOJ.225 For example, in two 1980s disputes involving the EPA, the
House’s Judiciary Committee squared off against the Energy and
Commerce Committee.226 In both disputes, the Judiciary Committee
successfully rebuffed efforts by the Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee to limit DOJ authority over Superfund settlements and over
Resource Conservation Recovery Act litigation.227
More telling, the Judiciary Committees and the DOJ are also
strong advocates of judicial power. DOJ power is formally moored
to the courts: DOJ control of litigation matters more when the
Supreme Court is a critical player in national policy making.228
Likewise, the power and prestige of the Judiciary Committees is
tied to judicial power. The more powerful the courts, the more sa-
lient is the Judiciary Committee’s confirmation power229 and its
oversight of the DOJ.230 Consequently, where as most committees
give short shrift to the courts, the Judiciary Committees are court-
centric.231
The characteristics of Judiciary Committee members likewise re-
flect their embrace of court-centric norms. Unlike power committees
its duty to defend and enforce).
223. See Devins & Herz, supra note 14, at 221.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 221-22.
227. See id. at 220-22. By limiting the DOJ, the EPA assumed a more prominent role and,
with it, the Energy and Commerce Committee was expanding its own power through its
oversight of the EPA. See id.
228. See Frost, supra note 13, at 917.
229. See Devins, Party Polarization, supra note 15, at 780-81.
230. See Devins & Herz, supra note 14, at 221.
231. For a competing perspective, see John C. Yoo, Lawyers in Congress, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1998, at 1, 6 (“[C]ongressional lawyers [do not bear the responsi-
bility of executing the law and therefore] do not hold any special relationship with another
branch, such as the Supreme Court, that might override their loyalty to the members or
institution of Congress.”).
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that members join in order to reward interest groups and voters,
members join the Judiciary Committees for “issue-based motiva-
tions,”232 in particular their personal interest in engaging in the
legalistic issues considered by the Committee.233 Lawyers, moreover,
are dominant on the Judiciary Committee. In 2015, 36.5 percent of
congressmen were lawyers; however, lawyers dominated the House
(72 percent) and Senate (70 percent) Judiciary Committees.234
Judiciary Committee members employ a “lawyer-like culture and
deliberative style”;235 not surprisingly, they care about court review
of their handiwork and consume substantial time in legalistic
debates about the constitutionality of the matters before them.236
Furthermore, Judiciary Committee members demonstrate respect
for basic legal principles, “adher[ing] to formal rules against
interfering in any way with ongoing litigation, and maintain[ing] a
general policy that no bills should take effect retroactively.”237
Committee staffers are also lawyers and familiar with Supreme
Court theories of statutory and constitutional interpretation.238
Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that the work of the DOJ
is of great interest to the Judiciary Committee members and of next
to no interest to other committees or members. Legal arguments
defending federal statutes or agency action take place after policy
is formulated.239 Members care about the making of policy and not
232. See DEERING & SMITH, supra note 145, at 72.
233. See Lynette P. Perkins, Member Recruitment to a Mixed Goal Committee: The House
Judiciary Committee, 43 J. POLITICS 348, 353-56 (1981).
234. See Nick Robinson, The Declining Dominance of Lawyers in U.S. Federal Politics 7,
39-40 (Harvard Law Sch. Ctr. on the Legal Profession, Research Paper No. 2015-10), http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2684731 [https://perma.cc/EV9T-93NR].
235. Mark C. Miller, Congressional Committees and the Federal Courts: A Neo-Institutional
Perspective, 45 W. POL. Q. 949, 961 (1992). The House Judiciary Committee is the only
committee to have a Parliamentarian. See Mark C. Miller, Congress and the Constitution: A
Tale of Two Committees, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 317, 337-38 (1993) [hereinafter Miller,
Congress and the Constitution].
236. See Miller, Congress and the Constitution, supra note 235, at 341 (contrasting
practices of the House Judiciary Committee to the House Energy and Commerce Committee).
237. Id. at 338.
238. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 180, at 581-82; see also Robert A. Katzmann,
Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge of Positive Political
Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 663 (1992) (contrasting Judiciary Committee interest in the ju-
diciary with general disinterest in courts).
239. See Devins, Party Polarization, supra note 15, at 760.
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ex post judicial interpretations.240 Correspondingly, the success or
failure of DOJ legal arguments is of little interest to most members.
Indeed, member acquiescence to DOJ control of litigation extends to
those rare instances when the DOJ does not defend the constitution-
ality of federal statutes.241
2. The DOJ’s Duty to Defend Federal Statutes
Lawmaker acceptance of both judicial supremacy and DOJ control
of government litigation is underscored by Congress’s approval of
DOJ practices regarding the defense of federal statutes. For the
most part, the DOJ defends federal law.242 On occasion, the DOJ
refuses to advance all plausible arguments in support of congres-
sional power.243 Obama Solicitor General Elena Kagan, for example,
refused to argue that limits on corporate campaign speech were
needed to prevent distortions in the political marketplace (an argu-
ment that the Supreme Court had previously upheld).244 Lawmakers
did not comment about this omission,245 and it may well be that
lawmakers hardly ever pay attention to the details of DOJ argu-
ments defending federal statutes.
More striking, lawmakers are sanguine both about DOJ non-
defenses of federal law and related DOJ arguments regarding
judicial supremacy.246 When the DOJ refuses to defend, the ex-
ecutive typically enforces the law in order to facilitate a judicial
challenge to the law. For example, in explaining the Obama Ad-
ministration’s decision to enforce but not defend the Defense of
240. See supra text accompanying notes 213-16.
241. See Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 595.
242. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 21, at 550. The DOJ defense of most federal stat-
utes both shields the DOJ from political attack within the executive and advances the status
of attorneys who work for the DOJ. See id. at 540. For a discussion of how bureaucratic theory
propels the duty to defend, see id. at 538-41.
243. See id. at 550.
244. See Letter from Michael W. McConnell, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., to the
Honorable Patrick Leahy, Chair, Senate Judiciary Comm. & the Honorable Jeff Sessions,
Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Comm. 2-3 (June 25, 2010), http://volokh.com/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/mcconnell-kagan-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDJ5-66R8].
245. At least, they did not comment until later. See id. at 3.
246. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 21, at 554.
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Marriage Act (DOMA), Attorney General Eric Holder declared that
the courts should be “the final arbiter of ... constitutional claims.”247
Lawmakers accept this DOJ defense of judicial supremacy.
Lawmakers who oppose legislation never call on the executive to
foreclose judicial challenges by refusing to enforce and defend.248 In
the DOMA case, for example, no lawmaker called for the President
to back up his view that DOMA was unconstitutional by refusing to
enforce the statute.249 Only three lawmakers spoke on the House or
Senate floor about the President’s action, and all three praised him
for his decision to enforce, but not defend, the statute.250 No member
of Congress formally took issue with the DOJ’s decision to tell the
Supreme Court that the House lacked constitutionally required
standing to fill in for the DOJ and defend DOMA.251
The DOMA case typifies congressional practice. Aside from ask-
ing DOJ nominees about their willingness to defend federal
statutes,252 Congress largely steers clear of DOJ conduct of federal
litigation, including decisions regarding the enforcement and de-
fense of federal statutes. In a 2012 study I conducted with Professor
Sai Prakash, we could find only three cases in which Congress
challenged the DOJ regarding its enforcement/defense of federal
statutes.253 Our conclusion, consistent with the claims of this Article,
was that “Congress generally accepts DOJ practices and that
lawmakers are much more interested in their own reelection and
the policy goals of their parties than they are in collective goods
implicating ‘the institutional power of Congress.’”254 In particular,
there is little to no pushback against DOJ arguments that constrain
247. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to the Honorable John A. Boehner,
Speaker of the House (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-
congress-litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act [https://perma.cc/BQ3M-BEG2].
248. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 21, at 554-55.
249. See id. at 551.
250. See 157 CONG. REC. 3540 (remarks of Rep. Jerrold Nadler); id. at 4152-53 (remarks
of Sen. Patrick Leahy); id. at 4152 (remarks of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
251. See Reply Brief for the United States on the Jurisdictional Questions at 9-11, United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).
252. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 21, at 552 (citing examples of confirmation hearing
questions).
253. See id. at 552-54.
254. Id. at 554 (quoting Moe & Howell, supra note 17, at 144). 
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congressional prerogatives, including cases in which the DOJ claims
that legislation is unconstitutional.255
3. The House and Senate Counsel
Congress’s acquiescence both to judicial power and to DOJ control
of litigation implicating the powers of Congress is further demon-
strated by the inability of the House and Senate counsel to advance
a pro-Congress agenda in court. Indeed, in today’s polarized
Congress, the House and Senate counsel exemplify Congress’s
disunitariness and the related inability of lawmakers to bond
together to advance a pro-Congress view of the law, in court or
elsewhere.256 To start, Congress is constrained by its bicameral
structure and the constitutional demand that Congress act as a
bicameral body.257 As a practical matter, bicameralism means that
there is not a unified Congress but separate houses of Congress.258
It also means that Congress will appear disunitary unless both the
House and Senate coordinate, advancing a coherent and consistent
pro-Congress view of the law.259 
Partisanship in Congress further hampers the ways these offices
might participate in litigation to advance a pro-Congress view of the
law. Ironically, these offices developed in the bipartisan post-
Watergate Era and were intended to represent congressional inter-
ests in court and thereby counterbalance DOJ control of government
255. See id. at 554-55.
256. See Devins, supra note 102. 
257. For a general treatment of this topic, see Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 603-22.
258. See Frost, supra note 13, at 949-50. For thoughtful proposals on how Congress might
overcome this disunitariness problem, see id. at 956-60.
259. Finally, bicameralism calls into question the ability of either the House or the Senate
to represent the views of Congress before the courts. Outside of issues (including con-
gressional investigations) that are under the control of one house, bicameralism means that
neither house can act unilaterally. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1356-57 (2014); Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 607-08. For this and
other reasons, it is unclear whether congressional counsel can intervene in litigation and
defend the constitutionality of federal statutes. The Supreme Court is yet to answer this
question definitively. In United States v. Windsor, the Court punted the question of whether
the House could defend DOMA after the DOJ announced it would not defend the statute. 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013). Concluding that the executive had standing because the lower court
decision invalidating the statute adversely affected the government, the Court simply noted
that it “need not decide” whether the House had standing to pursue the case. Id.
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litigation.260 In the late 1970s, Congress considered proposals to
create a unified “congressional counsel,” recognizing the need for co-
ordination and the fact that “[n]either House acting alone can assert
the prerogative[s] of representing ... Congress.”261 The House, how-
ever, rejected these efforts because of “inter-house rivalry” with the
more deliberative, less partisan Senate.262 Instead, legislation was
approved creating an Office of Senate Legal Counsel, an office
whose tasks included “defend[ing] vigorously ... the constitutional
power[s] of the Senate” and “the constitutionality of Acts and joint
resolutions of the Congress.”263 The House counsel developed around
the same time.264 Reflecting the fact that the majority party controls
the House, the office was largely “responsible to the Speaker of the
House.”265 Nonetheless, the principal tasks of the office were ini-
tially conceived to represent House interests in court—defending the
constitutionality of legislation and enforcing subpoenas against
executive branch officials.266
From 1978 (when the Senate Legal Counsel was created) through
1995, House and Senate counsel regularly participated in separation
of powers disputes before the Supreme Court.267 Most of these
disputes pitted congressional interests against executive branch
interests,268 and Congress typically defended its turf in bipartisan
ways. At least until 1986, Democrats and Republicans joined to-
gether in backing these filings; for example, amicus briefs rarely
called into question the position of institutional counsel.269 In the
260. See Rebecca Mae Salokar, Legal Counsel for Congress: Protecting Institutional In-
terests, 20 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 131, 136 (1993).
261. Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977, Blind Trusts and Other Conflict of Interest
Matters: Hearings on S. 555 Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong. 60-61
(1977) (statement of Sen. James Abourezk).
262. See Salokar, supra note 260, at 136 (quoting from an interview with Steven Ross); see
also Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 611-12.
263. 2 U.S.C. § 288h (2012).
264. See Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of Representing
in Court the Institutional Congressional Client, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1998, at
47, 49.
265. See Salokar, supra note 260, at 148; see also Tiefer, supra note 264, at 49-50 (noting
that House majority leaders hold the power to appoint the General Counsel).
266. See Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 608-10; Tiefer, supra note 264, at 49-50.
267. See Devins, supra note 43, at 950-52.
268. See id. at 950.
269. See id.; see also id. at 1016-17 (comparing amicus filings from 1974 to 2014).
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1983 legislative veto case, the House and Senate counsel partici-
pated in both briefing and oral argument; only one amicus brief was
filed in support of congressional power.270
Since 1995, however, party polarization has severely limited the
influence of institutional counsel. The House counsel—through the
majority party-controlled Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group—has
backed majority party preferences by defending federal statutes
that the Attorney General refused to defend.271 Prominent examples
include DOMA and a 2000 challenge to legislation overturning
Miranda v. Arizona.272 These efforts, however, have been undercut
by amicus filings by the minority party. In the DOMA case, for
example, 132 House Democrats joined together to file briefs arguing
both that DOMA was unconstitutional and that the House counsel
“does not speak” for the House.273
For its part, the Senate counsel did not participate in either
case,274 nor did it participate in the 2014 recess appointment case,
NLRB v. Noel Canning.275 Unlike the House (authorized to act by a
simple majority vote of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group), the
Senate counsel can only act if two-thirds of the Senate Leadership
Group backs the filing.276 The consequence of this super-majority
rule is that the Senate counsel never participates in litigation that
divides the parties.277 In the Noel Canning case, for example, Senate
Republicans joined together to file an amicus brief and make oral
arguments defending Senate prerogatives; Democratic Senators
270. See id. at 1017-18. For further discussion, see Tiefer, supra note 264, at 52-54.
271. See Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 609-10, 618.
272. For a discussion of the Attorney General’s refusal to defend Miranda-override legis-
lation, see Devins & Prakash, supra note 21, at 566-67; Seth P. Waxman, Essay, Defending
Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1087-88 (2001).
273. See Brief of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives—Including Objecting Mem-
bers of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, Representatives Nancy Pelosi and Steny H.
Hoyer—As Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee and Urging Affirmance at 1, Windsor
v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 12-2335). In the Miranda-override case,
“House Democratic Leadership” filed an amicus brief claiming the override statute was
unconstitutional. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the House Democratic Leadership in Support of
Petitioner at 22-24, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525).
274. See Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 617-19.
275. See Devins, supra note 102.
276. See Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 610, 613.
277. See Devins, supra note 43, at 951. 
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preferred to sit on the sidelines rather than to criticize President
Obama’s claims about recess appointments.278
No doubt, the House and Senate counsel no longer stand before
the courts as vigorous advocates of congressional prerogatives. The
House often appears at war with itself; the Senate can rarely a-
chieve the bipartisan consensus necessary to trigger Senate counsel
participation.279 Beyond these (and other) limits on Congress ad-
vancing pro-Congress arguments in court,280 the House and Senate
counsel stand as a testament to judicial supremacy. Outside of
impeachment,281 there are next to no examples of these offices claim-
ing that Congress has exclusive authority to settle a dispute.
Instead, these offices embrace and are propelled by judicial su-
premacy. Their raison d’etre is to represent Congress in court, and
their authority and importance are very much tied to judicial
authority. Like the Offices of Legislative Counsel and the Congres-
sional Research Service,282 the House and Senate counsel have
strong incentive to embrace judicial supremacy. Along with the
Judiciary Committees,283 judicial power propels the status and
authority of the very offices created by Congress to deal with
potential legal challenges to congressional action.
III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Congress acquiesces to judicial supremacy for a host of reasons.
Lawmakers have little incentive to invest in institutional concerns,
including the power of Congress in our system of checks and
278. See Devins, supra note 102.
279. See Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 618-22. Over the past twenty years, the Senate
counsel has only been involved in one major Supreme Court case involving congressional
power. That case, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, concerned Congress’s power to buck the State Depart-
ment by declaring Jerusalem a part of Israel for passport purposes. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081
(2015). Zivotofsky, however, is the exception that proves the rule; lawmaker statements about
the case make clear that Senate counsel participation had everything to do with lawmaker
attitudes towards Israel and nothing to do with abstract claims of congressional power. See
Devins, supra note 43, at 954-55.
280. For example, the House and Senate appear as separate entities so that there is no
unified congressional voice speaking in court. See Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 575-76.
281. See Brief for the Respondents and Amicus Curiae United States Senate at 16-18,
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (No. 91-740).
282. See supra Part II.A.
283. See supra Part II.B.1.
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balances. Unless an issue implicating congressional power also
serves political ends (reelection, constituency service, and so forth),
lawmakers will trade off institutional ends for first-order policy
preferences. Correspondingly, divisions within Congress over pol-
icy—especially in today’s polarized Congress—make it likely that
lawmakers will divide on basic questions of congressional power.
Bicameralism also fuels Congress’s inability to speak a single voice.
The House and the Senate may well have different priorities and
procedures; moreover, the simple fact that each House acts alone
casts doubt on the idea that there is a unitary Congress advancing
a pro-Congress agenda.
Lawmakers also acquiesce to judicial supremacy because court
decisions rarely figure into the policy-driven decision-making of
lawmakers and their staff. Courts are reactive—judicial rulings
are made after a statute is enacted or agency action is initiated.
Lawmakers focus on immediate policy objectives—the enactment of
laws and the prodding of agencies to advance lawmaker preferences.
Court review is almost always an afterthought, especially since
Congress hardly ever participates in litigation regarding the mean-
ing or constitutionality of statutes.284 Indeed, even when lawmakers
respond to a judicial ruling, lawmakers do not question how it is
that the ruling constrains congressional preferences and whether
the underlying doctrine needs to change.285 The focus is how to
advance the same policy through alternative means—so that this
emphasis on policy almost always overwhelms potential discussion
of congressional power writ large.
Finally, the institutions Congress has created to deal with legal
questions reinforce both lawmaker desires to steer clear of judicial
questions and to acquiesce to judicial supremacy. The centralization
284. For a discussion of instances in which House or Senate counsel appear in litigation
and why those instances highlight Congress’s limited role in litigation, see supra Part II.B.3.
For a related discussion of lawmaker amicus filings, see supra text accompanying notes 267-
78.
285. As Professor Keith Whittington and others have noted, Court decisions that make it
impossible to pursue first-order policy preferences have sufficient political salience for Con-
gress to seek to strike back against those decisions. See Whittington, supra note 17, at 509-10.
At the same time, there is some reason to question this claim. Congress, for example, refused
to enact Court-packing legislation. See 81 CONG. REC. 7381 (1937). Further, Congress’s failure
to use its exceptions power to constrain the Court suggests that lawmakers are loath to take
action against the Court. See infra Part III.A.
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of litigation authority in the DOJ, the delegation to the court-centric
Judiciary Committees of DOJ oversight, and the shifting of legal
resources away from subject matter committees have all contributed
to a system whereby most lawmakers wash their hands of court-
related issues. Correspondingly, lawmakers and their staff leave it
to the Offices of Legislative Counsel and the Congressional Research
Service to think about legal questions pertaining to legislative
language and related efforts to prod agencies to follow lawmaker
preferences. These offices are court-centric and have incentives to
broadly interpret judicial rulings limiting lawmaker power. The
House and Senate counsel are also court-centric in their orientation.
Party polarization further constrains the ability of these offices to
effectively advocate for broad claims of congressional power.
In documenting all of the above claims, I have provided a fairly
robust, and I hope nuanced, account of why lawmakers do not
challenge judicial supremacy. Let me close with two final exam-
ples—Congress’s failure to use its exceptions power to slap down the
Supreme Court for decisions lawmakers dislike and the 2016 fight
over Merrick Garland’s confirmation—as emblematic of the Senate’s
embrace of judicial supremacy.
A. The Exceptions Power 286
Congress’s power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s ap-
pellate jurisdiction is often seen as an “ever-present threat” to the
Court, a “sword of Damocles hanging over the Supreme Court.”287 In
1868, when prohibiting Supreme Court review of a lawsuit question-
ing the Reconstruction military government in the South, lawmak-
ers spoke of the Supreme Court having “no power to interfere with
the question of reconstruction.... [it] only ha[d] power to decide
cases, and it must receive the law from the lawmaking power.”288
The 1868 measure is one of hundreds considered by Congress but
it is only one of a handful in which Congress actually limited Su-
preme Court jurisdiction. From 1953 to 1968, Congress considered
286. Portions of the following three paragraphs are drawn from Devins, supra note 28, at
163.
287. Grove, supra note 18, at 930.
288. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2118 (1868) (remarks of Sen. Stewart).
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more than sixty bills to limit Court jurisdiction in response to
Warren Court decisions on school desegregation, criminal con-
fessions, the free speech rights of communists, and much more.289
Only one bill passed, a modest measure limiting the access of
alleged communists to government documents.290 In the 1970s and
1980s, Congress considered a raft of measures concerning abortion,
school busing, and school prayer but none passed.291 Senator Barry
Goldwater explained the prevailing view in Congress: “judicial
excess[ ]” should not be met with “legislative excess[ ].”292
From 2003 to 2008, Congress took aim at federal and state court
decisions on same-sex marriage, the Pledge of Allegiance, the public
display of the Ten Commandments, and judicial invocations of
international law.293 None of these measures were approved, and all
seemed to operate as rhetorical attacks by social conservatives in
the House of Representatives.294 Indeed, most of the measures never
made it out of committee, and none were even considered in the
Senate.295 Perhaps more telling, the principal target of lawmaker
attacks were lower federal courts and state courts;296 rather than
wait for Supreme Court action, lawmakers sought to score points
with their political base.297
289. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 23, at 29.
290. See Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3500 (2012)); Barry Friedman, “Things Forgotten” in the Debate Over Judicial
Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 752 (1998).
291. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 23, at 30-31.
292. See 128 CONG. REC. 4458 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater).
293. For a general treatment of these proposals, see Devins, Fear Congress?, supra note 18,
at 1348-58.
294. Party polarization figures largely in this story. House Republicans embraced an anti-
court agenda to win over their increasingly partisan base. See id. at 1356. Also, an upswing
in (very ideological) nonlawyers on the House Judiciary Committee and the anti-court rhetoric
of then-committee chair Jim Sensenbrenner made that committee less reverential towards
the courts during the 2003-2008 period. See MILLER, supra note 186, at 142-45.
295. See Devins, Fear Congress?, supra note 18, at 1356.
296. See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Pledge of
Allegiance as written violated Establishment Clause), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); Glassroth v. Moore, 275 F. Supp. 2d
1347, 1349-50 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (ordering removal of Ten Commandments statue from
Alabama courthouse); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003)
(legitimizing same-sex marriage in Massachusetts).
297. See Devins, Fear Congress?, supra note 18, at 1357.
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On those extremely rare occasions when Congress acted, more-
over, lawmakers seemed solicitous of the Supreme Court. 1996
legislation limiting successive habeas petitions nonetheless allowed
for original habeas petitions and, as such, allowed the Court to
“serve as expositor of the federal constitutional rules governing
criminal prosecutions.”298 2006 legislation, the Military Commission
Act, prohibited federal court consideration of habeas petitions by
Guantanamo detainees, limiting their rights to those afforded by
military commissions.299 When enacting the statute, lawmakers
claimed that they were acting at the Court’s invitation—from a
related 2006 case—to grant the “President the legislative authority
to create military commissions.”300 Moreover, legislative debates and
a proposed expedited Supreme Court review provision make clear
that lawmakers thought the Supreme Court was the appropriate
body to settle the question of the bill’s constitutionality.301
Lawmaker support for judicial authority is also revealed through
numerous bills expanding federal court jurisdiction and, more
generally, the authority of the Supreme Court. Most significant, “at
the very time that agitation [against the Court] by progressives and
labor leaders ... was reaching a new intensity,” Congress enacted the
Judiciary Act of 1925,302 legislation that substantially expanded
Supreme Court certiorari power and, with it, propelled the Supreme
Court’s status as the principal expositor of federal law.303 During the
Warren and Burger Court Eras—when lawmakers were threatening
to strip the Court of jurisdiction—Congress enacted measures
expanding federal court jurisdiction.304 Likewise, in the midst of
298. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 26, Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651
(1996) (No. 95-8836). For additional discussion, see Grove, supra note 18, at 991-92.
299. See Grove, supra note 18, at 992 & n.336.
300. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring); see Samuel
Estreicher & Diarmuid O’Scannlain, Hamdan’s Limits and the Military Commissions Act, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 403, 417 (2006).
301. See 152 CONG. REC. 20123-26 (2006) (remarks of Rep. Moore, Rep. Skelton, and Rep.
Jackson-Lee).
302. WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 253 (1994). For additional discussion, see Grove, supra
note 18, at 962-68.
303. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1705-13, 1733 (2000).
304. Compare Devins, Fear Congress?, supra note 18, at 1343-46 (explaining jurisdiction-
stripping threats), with Orrin G. Judd, The Expanding Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 60
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2003-2006 attacks on the Court, conservatives in Congress pushed
through legislation authorizing federal court review of a state court
judgment regarding the termination of life support for a brain-dead
woman.305
The fact that Congress almost always uses its exceptions power
to both bolster federal court jurisdiction and to strengthen the
Supreme Court’s power, of course, speaks volumes to lawmaker
acquiescence to court decision-making.306 Correspondingly, the fail-
ure of lawmakers to check judicial excess through the exceptions
power highlights lawmaker acquiescence to Court decision-making.
None of this is to say that Congress does not participate in constitu-
tional dialogues with the Court; it is to say that lawmakers consider
the exceptions power too blunt a tool. For reasons discussed above,
lawmakers have little interest in asserting institutional preroga-
tives and battling courts over the boundaries of congressional
power.307 Lawmakers, instead, are interested in pursuing first-order
policy priorities and see no reason to engage with courts when they
can pursue identical policy objectives through different means.308
B. The Confirmation Power
Let me close with a fairly obvious point about the 2016 fight over
President Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland to the Supreme
Court. The fight over Garland epitomizes the view that the Supreme
Court is a political court, that Democratic- and Republican-appoint-
ed Justices will rule differently, and that filibusters and other delay
tactics are increasingly common precisely because lawmakers see
the Supreme Court as the last word on politically salient issues.309
A.B.A. J. 938, 938-41 (1974) (describing expansions of federal court jurisdiction in the 1960s
and early 1970s).
305. See Charles Babington & Mike Allen, Congress Passes Schiavo Measure, WASH. POST
(Mar. 21, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/03/26/AR20050
32604055.html [https://perma.cc/6W92-SAKY].
306. Other examples of this phenomenon are 2016 House efforts to eviscerate Chevron
deference to federal agencies in favor of a judicial supremacy regime. See supra note 128.
307. See supra Part I.A.
308. See supra Part I.B.
309. See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court Is a Political Court. Republicans’ Ac-
tions Are Proof., WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-
supreme-court-is-a-political-court-republicans-actions-are-proof/2016/03/09/4c851860-e142-
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Before the Garland fight, ideological measures made clear that all
Democratic-appointed Justices were to the left of all Republican-
appointed Justices;310 also, changes in judicial appointment strat-
egies and the political polarization of Republican and Democratic
elites made it likely that party identity and ideology were inextrica-
bly linked.311 Correspondingly, party polarization transformed the
process of confirming lower federal court judges, resulting in a
dramatic upswing in the amount of time it takes for the Senate to
confirm judges and an equally dramatic downswing in the percent-
age of lower court nominees whom the Senate approves.312 The
refusal of Senate Republican leadership to hold hearings on Judge
Garland is cut from this same cloth. The related claim (made by
Senate Republican leadership) that voters should “make their voice
heard in the selection of Scalia’s successor as they participate in the
11e5-8d98-4b3d9215ade1_story.html [https://perma.cc/WM9K-T77J]. The confirmation power
is relevant to this Article for other reasons. The question of Congress’s power in our system
of checks and balances is rarely explored in confirmation hearings and debates. Lawmakers
are much more interested in a nominee’s views on privacy, race, and church-state matters
than on the commerce power, theories of statutory construction, or the separation of powers.
See Mitch McConnell & Chuck Grassley, McConnell and Grassley: Democrats Shouldn’t Rob
Voters of Chance to Replace Scalia, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/mcconnell-and-grassley-democrats-shouldnt-rob-voters-of-chance-to-replace-
scalia/2016/02/18/e5ae9bdc-d68a-11e5-be55-2cc3c1e4b76b_story.html [https://perma.cc/4TN9-
L948] (implying that controversial wedge issues like the separation of church and state
matter more to Justice selection than constitutional theory). As discussed earlier, the reason
is that lawmakers focus on first-order policy priorities; the scope of the commerce power and
theories of statutory interpretations are too far removed from first-order preferences. See
Devins, Party Polarization, supra note 15, at 762-64; see also McGinnis & Somin, supra note
99, at 99-100, 113-14 (explaining why federalism is sacrificed for the pursuit of first-order
policy preferences).
310. See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned
the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manu-
script at 3), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2432111 [https://perma.cc/UGX8-6CVD].
311. See id. (manuscript at 29-46). For a discussion of how President Trump’s nomination
of Judge Neil Gorsuch for the Supreme Court exemplifies Republican and Democratic
differences and the related rise of ideology in judicial appointment strategies, see Lawrence
Baum & Neal Devins, Federalist Court, SLATE (Jan 31, 2017, 10:12 PM), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/01/how_the_federalist_society_became_
the_de_facto_selector_of_republican_supreme.html [https://perma.cc/GL2M-JLWZ].
312. See Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Advice and Consent: The Politics of Con-
firming Federal Judges, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 265, 268-72 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce
I. Oppenheimer eds., 10th ed. 2013).
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process to select their next president” exemplifies both the ideo-
logical gap between the parties and the power of the Court.313 
Ironically, the Court’s power is very much tied to partisanship in
Congress. Polarization contributes to lawmaker disinterest in the
courts; it also contributes to the unwillingness of Republicans and
Democrats to come together to advance a pro-Congress view of the
law. When combined with other incentives for lawmakers to either
ignore the courts or acquiesce to judicial rulings, today’s Congress
is beset by a perfect storm that propels judicial supremacy. At the
same time, even if Congress were once again to become bipartisan,
most of the forces that propel judicial supremacy would not abate.
Lawmakers and their staff care about policy making, and court
rulings rarely prevent Congress from advancing its policy priorities.
313. See McConnell & Grassley, supra note 309. For much the same reason, several Dem-
ocrats claim that Republicans stole the Scalia seat and, as such, Trump Supreme Court pick
Neil Gorsuch should be rejected. See Jeff Merkley, Don’t Let Republicans Steal the Seat, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/opinion/make-the-republicans-go-
nuclear.html [https://perma.cc/L5Q6-WH7X]. Democrats have also embraced judicial author-
ity by rallying in favor of judicial independence and, correspondingly, the need for the courts
to check the President—a concern that has spilled over to the Gorsuch confirmation in the
wake of President Trump’s attacks on judges who ruled against his January 2017 executive
order on immigration. See Robert Barnes, Trump’s Blasts at Judge Raise Questions for
Gorsuch on Independence, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/courts_law/trumps-blasts-at-judge-raise-questions-for-gorsuch-on-independence/2017/
02/05/1642212c-ebc2-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html [https://perma.cc/XBF5-M8PQ].
